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CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and Reality
NITZAN SHILON*
This Article is the first academic endeavor to analyze the efficacy and
transparency of stock ownership policies (SOPs) in U.S. public firms. SOPs
generally require managers to hold some of their firms’ stock for the long term.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, firms universally adopted these policies and
cited them more than any other policy as a key element in their mitigation of risk.
However, my analysis of the recent SOPs of S&P 500 CEOs disputes what firms
claim about these policies. First, I find that SOPs are extremely ineffectual in
making CEOs hold on to their firm’s stock; this is because these policies generally
function in a way that allows CEOs to immediately unload virtually all of the stock
they own. Second, I show that firms camouflage this weakness in their public
filings. I explain why my findings are troubling and I propose a regulatory reform
to make SOPs transparent. Transparency can be expected to push boards and
shareholders to improve the actual content of these policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 2008–09 financial crisis, regulators, firms, investors, and practitioners
around the world have been trying to ensure that executive pay arrangements in
public firms discourage managers from taking excessive risks and pursuing
short-term gains at the expense of long-term value.1 In particular, shareholders

1. The recent Basel II amendment requires banking regulators at the international level to
monitor compensation structures with a view to decoupling compensation from short-term profits.
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 25–
27 (2009). The G-20 leaders are committed to implementing international standards to discourage
excessive risk taking. Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit 2 (Sept. 24–25, 2009),
available at https://www.g20.org/official_resources/leaders%E2%80%99_statement_pittsburgh
_summit.The United Kingdom has already implemented requirements to establish remuneration
policies that promote effective risk management. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., REFORMING
REMUNERATION PRACTICES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: FEEDBACK ON CP09/10 AND FINAL RULES
app. 1 at 3–13 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps09_15.pdf. Other
countries have been moving in this direction as well. See, e.g., SWISS FIN. MKT. SUPERVISORY
AUTH., REMUNERATION SCHEMES: MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR REMUNERATION SCHEMES OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–7 (2010), available at http://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents
/finma-rs-2010-01-e.pdf (requiring simple, transparent, long-term remuneration schemes;
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have pushed firms to adopt stock ownership policies (SOPs), which require senior
executives and directors to hold a minimum dollar value of their firms’ stock until
retirement and, in some cases, thereafter. In addition to shareholder pressure to
adopt SOPs, the federal government has prescribed strict SOPs for some firms,2
prominent public officials have emphasized the importance of SOPs,3 business
leaders have stressed the need for them,4 and proxy-voting firms have rewarded
firms for adopting them.5 As a result, the prevalence of SOPs reached an all-time
high of 95% among the top 250 U.S. public firms in 2013.6
Firms have adopted SOPs and held them to attain very important goals. One
such goal is to align the interests of managers with those of their long-term
shareholders. When SOPs tie managers’ personal wealth to their firms’ long-term
value, managers have greater incentives to maximize such value. Empirical studies
support this view and show that when management ownership rises in widely held
firms, firm value increases significantly.7 Consistent with this theory, in a response
to Facebook cofounder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s announcement on September
independent control over the implementation of those schemes; and the structuring of
remuneration to enhance risk awareness).
2. Despite its general approach against regulating the substance of corporate
governance provisions, the federal government has prescribed strict SOPs for all Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients. Specifically, the Treasury regulations preclude
TARP recipient executives from cashing out any vested stock before TARP funds are repaid.
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (2012).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg163.aspx
(declaring
that
“compensation should be structured to account for the time horizon of risks”); Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of
America's National Convention and Techworld: The Financial Crisis and Community
Banking (Mar. 20, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20090320a.htm#fn3 (stating that “poorly designed compensation policies can
create perverse incentives” and that “[m]anagement compensation policies should be aligned
with the long-term prudential interests of the institution, be tied to the risks being borne by
the organization, . . . and avoid short-term payments for transactions with long-term horizons”).
4. See, e.g., Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at 7 (declaring that “an individual’s performance should be evaluated
over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking”).
5. See generally GARY HEWITT, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., GOVERNANCE
RISK INDICATORS 2.0 (2012), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/GRId2.0
_TechnicalDocument20120306.pdf.
6. See MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS, LLC, 2013 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & INCENTIVE
DESIGN SURVEY 11 (2013) (reporting that only 5% of the 250 largest publicly traded firms did not
disclose stock ownership guidelines for their CEOs), available at http://www.meridiancp.com
/images/uploads/Meridian_2013_Governance_and_Design_Survey.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management
Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 293 (1988) (reporting that “Tobin’s
Q first increases, then declines [when ownership becomes concentrated], and finally rises
slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises”). Tobin’s Q, named after Nobel Prize
winner James Tobin, is a measure that reflects the effectiveness with which a company turns
a given book value into market value. It specifically measures the ratio of the combined
market value of equity and debt to their combined book value.

356

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:353

4, 2012, that he would keep his Facebook stock for at least until the next year,
Facebook’s stock price rose by 5%.8
Second, because firms claim that their SOPs discourage excessive risk taking,
they commonly cite those policies as a key element in their mitigation of risk.9 The
theory is that without SOPs managers might have incentives to elevate the firm’s
risk and increase stock price volatility. Such managers expect to profit from the
higher volatility in stock price by pocketing greater amounts if they hold on to their
stock while the price increases and to avoid losses by quickly selling their stock
before the price plummets.10
Third, firms hold their SOPs to discourage managers from sacrificing the long
term for the short term. Without SOPs, managers might be tempted to take actions
that would boost the stock price in the short term, even if those actions would pile
up latent and excessive risk of an implosion later on. They might do so if they
could unload their stock before such an implosion occurs. Even if they do not know
if or when such an implosion will actually occur, they might still take such a
strategy if they can gradually sell enough stock, thereby protecting themselves from
a possible future collapse. A 2010 study suggests that such incentives played a role
in the risk-taking decisions of the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers during the years preceding their firms’ meltdowns in 2008.11 SOPs are
expected to discourage managers from taking such actions by limiting managers’
ability to sell their stock.
In addition to what firms claim about their SOPs, these policies should fulfill an
important function by tying pay to performance. Without effective SOPs, CEOs who
have performed poorly may nevertheless earn a salary that is not commensurate with
their performance. They might even generate profits by taking excessive risks.12

8. See Sam Gustin, Facebook Blame-Game: Who’s at Fault for IPO Debacle?, TIME
(Sep. 6, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/09/06/facebook-blame-game-whos-at-fault
-for-ipo-debacle/. While the company’s stock price rose 5% on the day after Zuckerberg’s
announcement, such price was still nearly 50% below the initial public offering (IPO) price.
9. See Press Release, Equilar, Inc., Long-Term Performance Compensation Is Most Popular
Risk-Management Strategy (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.prlog.org/10637727-long
-term-performance-compensation-is-most-popular-risk-management-strategy.html.
10. See generally Tao Chen, Vidhi Chhaochharia & Rik Sen, Holding On for Good
Times: The Information Content of CEOs’ Voluntary Equity Exposure (Aug. 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~vchhaochharia/dokuwiki
/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=ceo_equity_exposure_19aug2012.pdf (reporting that CEOs have
private information about future stock price performance and that they generally use that
information to choose their stock exposure levels to the firm).
11. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure:
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257,
260 (2010) (stating that the top-five-executive teams of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers
cashed out large amounts of stock selling and cash bonus during 2000–08, the years that led
to the credit crisis). However, commentators disagree on whether poor incentives contributed
to the recent crisis. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
12. A CEO without an effective SOP may generate personal profits by increasing his
stock holdings before taking an excessively risky project and unloading such stock before
the project fails. For example, General Motors’ decision not to fix the faulty ignition
switches in its Chevrolet Cobalts more than ten years ago was mentioned as a consequence
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Finally, these policies are important because they set rules that apply widely to
stock-based compensation, which is by far the most significant component of
executive pay today. The boom in incentive pay that started in the 1990s pushed
stock-based compensation so high that today the median compensation packages of
CEOs of firms included in the S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500)13
includes 80% of stock.14 Moreover, the explosion of stock-based compensation was
not accompanied by a reduction in non-stock-based compensation. Therefore, the
total compensation amounts of the top five executives in public firms trended up to
some 10% of these firms’ total earnings.15
However, while in theory SOPs are important, in practice they are paper tigers.
Using statistical analyses of quantitative and qualitative data disclosed in proxy
statements of firms included in the S&P 500,16 I show that these policies are
extremely ineffectual in making CEOs hold on to their firms’ stock and, in fact,
typically allow CEOs to unload virtually all of their vested stock whenever they
wish.17 For example, the SOP of UPS would not prevent its CEO, Scott Davis,
of GM executive compensation incentives. It apparently saved GM costs and increased its
stock price in the short term, but came at the expense of a severe long-term problem after this
decision was linked to thirteen deaths. Without an effective SOP, GM executives might have
generated personal profits by selling their stock before the catastrophic results were uncovered.
See Gretchen Morgenson, The Wallet as Ethics Enforcer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014, at BU1.
13. The S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index is a market value weighted index
composed of 500 stocks of leading companies in leading industries within the U.S. economy.
See S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/indices.htm.
14. See EQUILAR, INC., 2014 CEO PAY STRATEGIES REPORT 6, 14 (2014), available at
http://info.equilar.com/rs/equilar/images/equilar-2014-ceo-pay-strategies-report.pdf?mkt_tok
=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRojuKTNZKXonjHpfsX67%2BgqXrHr08Yy0EZ5VunJEUWy3YoITt
Q%2FcOedCQkZHblFnV0PSq28UaoNoqIK (reporting that in 2013 the median S&P 500
CEO was paid a total compensation of roughly $10.1 million, while his stock-based
compensation amounted to about $8.1 million).
15. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 297 (2005) (reporting that the ratio of the aggregate top five
compensation to the aggregate earnings of public firms increased from 5% in 1993–95 to
9.8% in 2001–03).
16. The SEC requires that shareholders of a public company receive a proxy statement
prior to any shareholder meeting. The proxy statement must include all important facts about
the issues on which shareholders are asked to vote. Such information should include how
management is paid and what potential conflict-of-interest issues may arise with auditors.
See Proxy Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/proxy.htm.
17. Vesting periods define when ownership of stock options or restricted stock transfers
to managers. See Brian D. Cadman, Tjomme O. Rusticus & Jayanthi Sunder, Stock Option
Grant Vesting Terms: Economic and Financial Reporting Determinants, 18 REV. ACCT.
STUD. 1159, 1159 (2013). Vesting periods in the United States are usually three to five years
for executives but are shorter for board members. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman,
The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 7 (2000). Typically, the
executive earns the prorated amount of his equity grant each year. See Equity Vesting
Schedules for S&P 1500 CEOs, EQUILAR, INC. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.equilar.com
/publications/articles/equity-vesting-schedules-for-s-p-1500-ceos. For example, when an
executive is granted three hundred restricted stock units with a three-year vesting schedule,
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from immediately selling all his vested UPS stock—worth over $30 million—
should he choose to do so.18 Moreover, a recent study shows that most top
executives take full advantage of their freedom to unload their firms’ stock and
engage in massive stock selling.19
This Article is the first academic endeavor to discuss both the ineffectiveness
and lack of transparency of SOPs. My research indicates that the ineffectiveness of
recent SOPs is driven by their design. In particular, firms generally fail to employ
robust frameworks that require managers to always retain some of the stock they
receive as compensation. Instead, the vast majority of SOPs require managers to hit
a certain stock ownership threshold in the future, but they are sabotaged in several
ways by their own design.
First, common SOPs allow managers to count their unvested stock (stock that
they do not own yet)20 to satisfy their SOP requirements; for the CEOs who do this,
it is usually their only effort at compliance with those policies. For example, Mr.
Davis satisfies his $8.4 million UPS SOP requirement solely by counting $12.3
million worth of stock he does not own yet.21
Second, the average SOP sets its target stock-holding threshold lower than 50%
of a single year’s total compensation.22 SOPs are commonly framed to require
CEOs to hold five times their base salary.23 But as the average S&P 500 CEO earns
a base salary of less than 10% of his annual total pay,24 his SOP threshold amounts
to less than 50% of such pay.
Third, these policies usually allow CEOs to take five years to attain the required
stock thresholds.25 This delay is significant for S&P 500 CEOs, whose average
tenure has recently shrunk to eight years.26 Such weakness is particularly important
that CEO will typically own one hundred units after one year, another one hundred units
after two years, and the remaining one hundred units after three years. SOPs define the postvesting stock holding requirements.
18. As of February 1, 2013, Scott Davis beneficially owned 385,167 Class A UPS
shares. Because the market price of each such share on the NYSE was then $79.97, the total
value of Davis’s vested UPS stock was more than $30.8 million. This estimate does not take
into account the $460 million worth of vested UPS stock owned by the Annie E. Casey
Foundation, Inc., of which Davis serves on the corporate Board of Trustees. See United
Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 29 (Mar. 15, 2013).
19. See Tomislav Ladika, Do Firms Replenish Executives’ Incentives After Equity
Sales? 2 (Sept. 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023858 (reporting that 61% of top executives in S&P 1500 firms
sell firm equity at least once during their tenure, with the median sale equal to 15% of the
executive’s total holdings in the firm).
20. See infra Part V.B.
21. See infra Part V.B.
22. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. The average S&P 500 CEO earns a base salary of less than 10% of his annual total
pay because his base salary is some $1 million while his total compensation is some $10.1
million. EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14.
25. See infra Part V.D.
26. The average tenure of a departing S&P 500 CEO in the United States was eight
years in 2010, down from ten years in 2000. See THE CONFERENCE BD., THE 2011 CEO
SUCCESSION REPORT 13 (2011).
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because most policies do not require CEOs to hit any stock ownership milestone
before their phase-in periods lapse.
Finally, SOPs commonly do not specify the sanctions for breaching them. This
omission might suggest that these policies are merely advisory rather than
mandatory, which further weakens SOPs. Absent mandatory sanctions on
executives who, for example, sell their stock in violation of their SOPs, the board
of directors is left to exercise its own discretion on how to deal with such
violations. For a variety of financial, social, and psychological reasons, executives
have power and influence over directors that make it 27
costly and difficult for
directors to act in ways that are unfavorable for executives. Therefore, directors in
publicly traded companies cannot be relied on to impose sanctions on their
executives after a violation occurs.
In addition to the extreme ineffectiveness of SOPs—and certainly more
troubling—is the lack of transparency as firms camouflage the weakness of their
policies in their public filings. In particular, not a single firm discloses big-picture
indicators of policy weakness, such as the amount of stock managers are allowed to
immediately unload and the amount of stock they have already unloaded.28
Firms also fail to disclose some critical terms of their SOPs, such as counting
policies,29 phase-in periods,30 or sanctions. Moreover, when such terms are
disclosed, their implications are not made clear. For example, firms fail to indicate
how their counting of unvested or hedged stock undermines their SOPs.31
My findings about SOP ineffectiveness and lack of transparency are troubling.
Because of their extreme ineffectiveness, these policies are unlikely to affect
managers’ incentives and behavior, and so they are incapable of achieving the
important goals they were established to attain. Such ineffectiveness comes at the
shareholders’ expense because the policies’ weakness makes it impossible to align
managers’ interests with those of their shareholders.
Also, because the ineffectiveness of these policies is camouflaged, investors are
unable to know whether the SOPs are valuable and whether they fulfill their
purpose. One needs credible and detailed information in order to exercise good
judgment. Without such information about the functionality of SOPs, boards and
shareholders are unable to assess these policies accurately and make informed
decisions as to whether and how they should be improved. The philosophy of U.S.
securities regulations is to facilitate informed and intelligent decision making by

27. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23–27 (2004) (describing sources of
executives’ influence over directors in public companies).
28. See infra Part VI.A.
29. I call a “counting policy” the SOP terms that define the type of equity securities that
may be counted toward meeting the policies’ target ownership threshold.
30. I call a “phase-in period” the length of time allowed to the executive or director to
attain his target stock threshold.
31. A “hedge” is buying one security and selling another to reduce risk. See RICHARD
BREALY, STEWART MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, G-8
(11th ed. 2013). When, for example, CEOs short sell their company stock against their SOP
stock, they nullify their SOPs.
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investors,32 but with SOPs, investors simply do not have the information to make
such decisions.
Shareholders believe that these policies are at least sometimes desirable, and so
they push firms to adopt them; proxy-voting firms back up shareholders and reward
firms for having SOPs;33 and firms adopt SOPs, declaring that their purpose is to
attain important goals, such as acting as a curb on incentives for excessive
managerial risk taking.34 However, declaring that SOPs are adopted to attain
important goals and then camouflaging their inability to achieve those goals creates
confusion and sends mixed messages.
Also, the fact that SOP ineffectiveness is camouflaged suggests that their
weakness is undesirable. If the weakness of SOPs were a selling point in markets,
its disclosure would increase stock price and firm value; however, since firms are
unable to justify the weakness of their policies, they hide it.
A possible explanation for why SOPs are both extremely ineffective and
camouflaged is that managers have excessive power vis-à-vis shareholders. This
combination of limp and camouflaged policies allows managers to reap the
reputational benefits of being subject to effective SOPs, meanwhile avoiding the
personal costs that are associated with having such policies. In particular, SOP
camouflage misleads markets into believing that managers’ incentives are better
aligned with those of long-term shareholders, that managers no longer have
incentives to take excessive risks, and that boards are not feckless. At the same
time, it allows managers to avoid incurring the personal diversification and
liquidity costs associated with having effective SOPs. Finally, SOP camouflage
serves managers by making it unlikely that outsiders will exert pressure on firms to
make their SOPs more effective, which would, of course, force executives to incur
the costs they seek to avoid.
To remedy these flaws, I propose a regulatory reform to make SOPs transparent.
In particular, I propose reforming the rules that govern public firms’ filings with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Regulation S-K.35
I offer specific quantitative measures to gauge SOP bottom-line efficacy, as well as
certain qualitative measures that focus on the functioning of SOP design. With this
information, I expect boards and shareholders assisted by proxy advisors, executive
compensation advisors, and practitioners, to identify and remedy the flaws inherent
in their SOPs.

32. See Ray Garrett Jr., Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Union
League Club, Public Affairs Committee 8 (Feb. 20, 1975), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/022075garrett.pdf (declaring that “[n]otwithstanding
some recent questioning of this philosophy, we are persuaded that the original
assumptions—that full disclosure permits investors to make informed and intelligent choices
. . . are as valid today as they were forty years ago”).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See Equilar, Inc., supra note 9 (reporting that tying compensation to long-term
performance is the most commonly cited risk-management strategy (72% in proxy filings of
one hundred companies with yearly revenues of $12.5 billion or greater)).
35. Regulation S-K is a prescribed regulation under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 that
lays out reporting requirements for various SEC filings used by public companies. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229 (2013).
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This Article is developed in nine Parts. First, I explain the importance of SOPs
as managerial incentives to maximize long-term shareholder value and avoid
excessive risk taking. Second, I describe the several waves of SOP adoptions and
the widespread pressure that led to them. Third, I present my methodology for
studying SOPs in S&P 500 firms. Fourth, I describe the two major frameworks that
firms use to design their SOPs. Fifth, I provide evidence for the extreme
ineffectiveness of recent SOPs, after which I analyze the camouflaging of such
ineffectiveness. In the seventh Part, I explain why SOP ineffectiveness and its
camouflaging are troubling, and after that I propose reforms to make these policies
transparent and therefore improve SOPs. The ninth Part presents my conclusion.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES (SOPS)
Firms hold their SOPs to attain important goals.36 The three main goals in this
regard are (1) to align managerial interests with those of their shareholders,37 (2) to
discourage managers from pursuing short-term gains at the expense of long-term
value creation,38 and (3) to discourage inappropriate risk taking related to the
company’s business.39
The proxy statement of Limited Brands, Inc. summarizes the commonly
declared SOP objectives: “In addition to aligning the interests of our executive
officers with those of our stockholders, the share ownership guidelines promote a
long-term focus and discourage inappropriate risk-taking.”40
A. SOPs Help To Align Managers’ Interests with Those of Shareholders
In most large American corporations, ownership is separate from control.41 This
separation happens when managers do not own most of the shares of the
corporations they run. When manager-agents own little stock in a firm and
shareholder-principals are too dispersed to force managers to maximize firm value,
agency costs are created and corporate assets may be abused to benefit managers at
the expense of shareholders.42 Such agency costs may be triggered by managers

36. Firms declare these goals in their new mandatory reporting of risk management
strategies and in the “Compensation Management Discussion and Analysis” chapter of their
proxy statements.
37. See, e.g., First Horizon Nat’l Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 53 (Mar. 16,
2010); Marsh & McLennan Cos., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 41 (Mar. 30, 2010).
38. See, e.g., CA, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 39 (June 8, 2010); Family
Dollar Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Dec. 11, 2009).
39. See, e.g., Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 23 (Mar. 23,
2010); Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Dec. 11, 2009).
40. Ltd. Brands, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 21 (Apr. 7, 2010).
41. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (1932).
42. “Agency relationship” is a contract under which the principal(s) engage another
person(s) (the agent(s)) to perform a service on behalf of the principal(s), which involves the
delegation of a decision-making authority to the agent(s). See Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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diverting corporate resources to themselves, taking perquisites, and exerting too
little effort (“shirking”). The costs may also be triggered by managerial pursuit of
non-value-maximizing objectives, such as making excessive acquisitions (“empire
building”), encouraging excessive sales growth, and putting employee interests ahead
of shareholders’ interests. When managers’ time horizons differ from those of
long-term shareholders,43 they may take excessive risks and pursue short-term gains.
Managerial agency costs can be significantly reduced if divergences from
shareholder interests are limited by establishing appropriate incentives for
managers. In particular, SOPs align managers’ interests with those of shareholders
by requiring managers to hold a certain amount of their firms’ stock. The theory is
that as their stakes rise, managers pay a larger share of the costs associated with
their non-value-maximizing acts. Thus, they are less likely to squander corporate
wealth and more likely to work harder to increase firm value.44 In support of this
theory, a series of empirical studies shows that executives who hold more stock are
significantly better stewards for shareholders, both in maximizing their value and in
generating higher operating income.45
The desire to align managerial interests with shareholder interests by increasing
managerial stock holdings resulted in a dramatic change in executive compensation
in the 1990s. During that decade, stock-based compensation spread at explosive
rates in the United States, and compensation committees routinely justified this
surge as having the effect of increasing managerial stock ownership. Between 1992
and 2000, the average inflation-adjusted compensation of S&P 500 CEOs more
than quadrupled, climbing from $3.5 million to $14.7 million and fueled primarily
by an increase in the use of stock options.46 The ratio of the top five executives’
aggregate pay to public firms’ aggregate earnings increased from 5% in 1993–95 to
some 10% in 2001–03.47 Institutional investors and shareholder activists have
tolerated and even encouraged the surge in executive pay, believing that managerial
ownership may reduce agency problems.48
Stock-based compensation also increased during the 2000s and has since
become the biggest component of executive compensation at large, publicly traded

43. This may happen because of managers’ career concerns or their ability to trade on
inside information.
44. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 308 (explaining that “[t]he principal can
limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent . . . to
limit the aberrant activities of the agent” (emphasis omitted)).
45. See, e.g., Morck et al., supra note 7; Robert Tumarkin, How Much Do CEO Incentives
Matter? (July 11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu
/rtumarki/research/HMDCIM.pdf (reporting that “[f]or the mean incentive level, Tobin’s q
increases by 10.0% compared to that of counterfactual firms that lack CEO incentive
compensation”). A similar empirical conclusion has been reported by Bhagat and Tookes with
regard to the positive effect that actual directorial equity holding has over future operating
performance. See Sanjai Bhagat & Heather Tookes, Voluntary and Mandatory Skin in the
Game: Understanding Outside Directors’ Stock Holdings, 18 EUR. J. FIN. 191 (2011).
46. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 49, 51 (2003).
47. See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 15.
48. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the
Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1367 (2000).
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U.S. firms. For the average S&P 500 CEO in 2013, stock-based compensation—
namely stock options and restricted stock—was worth some $8.1 million, which
amounted to more than 80% of the CEO’s $10.1 million total compensation.49
By requiring managers to keep some of their stock-based compensation, SOPs aim
to maintain the manager-shareholder alignment incentives that equity pay provides.
Warren Buffett showed by self-example that he supports this view: in 2008, Buffett
conditioned his sizable Goldman Sachs and GE investments by making those
companies’ executives commit to not selling more than 10% of their stock until the
earlier of three years or the termination of Buffett’s investment.50 Many people
believe that the importance that Buffett places on SOPs should serve as a wake-up
call to both firms and investors in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.51
Similarly, Facebook shareholders have made it clear that they value managerial
ownership and see it as a sign of commitment to their company. Despite their
growing concern about the company’s tanking stock price and torrent of criticism,
Facebook shareholders sent the company’s stock price 5% higher in response to the
September 4, 2012, announcement of Mark Zuckerberg, cofounder and CEO, that
he would keep his Facebook stock for at least the next year.52
B. SOPs Discourage Managers from Pursuing Short-Term Gains
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke stressed the importance of
discouraging managers from seeking short-term gains,53 a goal that SOPs
should fulfill by requiring managers to hold their firms’ stock for the long term.
Managers who are allowed to sell enough stock quickly might take actions that
would boost the stock price in the short term even if they would certainly
destroy value in the long term. Such actions include making distorted
investment decisions,54 engaging in direct earnings management55 or

49. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14.
50. See The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 16 (Apr. 6, 2009).
51. See “Hold Through Retirement”: Maximizing the Benefits of Equity Awards While
Minimizing Inappropriate Risk Taking, CORP. EXEC. (Exec. Press, Inc., Concord, CA), Nov.–
Dec. 2008, at 1.
52. See Gustin, supra note 8.
53. See Bernanke, supra note 3 (stressing the need to avoid using short-term metrics for
transactions with long-term horizons when paying managers).
54. See Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 2169, 2195 (2009) (reporting evidence that firms engaged in fraudulent
accounting to boost short-term price also hire and invest too much, distorting the allocation
of real sources); Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate
Investment: A Test of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 212 (2009) (finding that
managers with short-term horizons engage in high abnormal investments and suffer
subsequently from low stock returns, and that this phenomenon is more severe in firms with
higher research and development intensity or share turnover).
55. “Direct earnings management” is the strategic timing of investment, sales,
expenditures, and financing decisions to influence short-term accounting results and the
short-term stock price at the expense of long-term economic value. See François Degeorge,
Jayendu Patel & Richard Zeckhauser, Earnings Management To Exceed Thresholds, 72 J.
BUS., 1, 2–3 (1999). To manage reported earnings, for example, short-term managers
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misreporting,56 and making certain public statements or performing other acts
of “window dressing.”57
At any given time, the short-term incentives of the manager will depend on the
fraction of stock-based instruments that can be freely unloaded in the near future as
opposed to the fraction that is tied up for the long term. When the manager is allowed
to sell enough stock quickly, he might take actions that boost the stock price in the
short run even if they might hurt the firm’s long-term reputation and performance.
C. SOPs Help To Curb Managers’ Incentives To Take Excessive Risks
SOPs should address two types of managerial incentives to take excessive risks.
The first type involves opportunities to profit from stock price volatility.58 Managers
who are looking to capitalize on their inside information will pursue actions that may
increase the riskiness of the firm’s operations and thereby increase stock volatility;
this is because greater stock volatility makes it more profitable for managers to
unload their stock before its value tanks or keep it if the price stands to increase.59
For example, consider a transaction that will boost a firm’s stock price from $40
to $60 if it succeeds but would tank the price from $40 to $20 if it fails. There is a
50% probability of either success or failure. Such a transaction significantly
increase the frequency of short-term, retail-level marketing actions (price discounts, feature
advertisements, and aisle displays) at the expense of long-term brand equity investment
(such as television advertisement) to influence the timing of consumers’ purchases. See
Craig J. Chapman & Thomas J. Steenburgh, An Investigation of Earnings Management
Through Marketing Actions (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-073, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=930738. Real earning
management neither violates securities law nor is prohibited by corporate law. See, e.g.,
Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (ruling that directors are
allowed to deliberately cause their firms to pay extra taxes so that the firms can report higher
short-term earnings), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976).
56. “Misreporting” is the practice of “earnings manipulation involving merely the
discretionary accounting of decisions and outcomes already realized.” See Degeorge et al.,
supra note 55, at 3. Earnings manipulation can either be legal, so that it does not violate the
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or illegal. From 1998 to 2004, for example,
Fannie Mae illegally manipulated its quarterly earnings so that its executives could pocket
higher bonuses. Reworking its accounting has cost Fannie Mae some $1 billion. See Marcy
Gordon, Wall St. Applauds Fannie Mae Restatement, FOX NEWS (Dec. 7, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2006Dec07/0,4675,FannieMae,00.html.
57. When a CEO’s ownership of stock options increases, the company is more likely to
be involved in financial misreporting; however, the CEO’s ownership of other compensation
components, such as restricted stock or long-term incentive payouts, is not associated with a
higher propensity to misreport. See Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of
Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 63 (2006).
58. For managers to have superior information, such risk should be latent or the timing
in which it materializes should be known only to them.
59. Such protection from stock depreciation renders managers’ stock akin to stock
options. This is because stock option holders may fully gain from stock price appreciation
but are entirely protected against any decrease in stock price. Stock option value increases
with volatility of stock for this reason: greater volatility offers its holder more potential for
an upside without risking losses from greater potential for downside movement. Managers
who may unload their stock freely enjoy similar incentives.
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elevates the firm’s risk but does not create any value for shareholders. Thus,
managers who are unhampered by effective SOPs might be motivated to pursue
this project and take advantage of their inside information to sell their stock before
market price changes if the project appears likely to fail (or buy new stock if it
appears likely to succeed).60 In support of this view, Peter Tufano’s empirical study
shows that firms whose managers hold more stock have better corporate risk
management policies.61
The second type of incentive to take excessive risks involves short-termism,
which happens when managers are able to realize a short-term increase in profits at
the expense of latent and excessive risks of an implosion later on.62 In this case,
managers do not need inside information about if and when the excessive risk will
translate into an actual implosion. Instead, if the short-term stock price increase is
significant enough, the subsequent and consistent unloading of a significant amount
of stock might suffice to render such a strategy profitable for managers. In support
of this view, a recent study suggests that incentives created by managerial freedom
to unload large fractions of stock-based incentives played a role in the risk-taking
decisions of the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers during
the years preceding the firms’ meltdown.63
Effective SOPs would require managers to hold their firm stock for the long
term rather than selling the stock quickly before the latent risk materializes and the
value plummets. This would prevent managers from avoiding the potential future
decline in stock price.
Because of their potential importance in regard to risk mitigation, SOPs have
become the most popular single policy that firms cite to show that they accomplish
this goal. In 2010, the SEC required companies for the first time to discuss the level
of risk inherent in their compensation programs within their proxy statements.
Having SOPs was the most commonly cited policy (almost 60% in proxy filings of
one hundred companies with yearly revenues of $12.5 billion or greater),64 ahead of
strategies that are directly designed to discourage undue risk, such as the balance of

60. See Chen et al., supra note 10.
61. See generally Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk
Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097 (1996).
62. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 274 (explaining that the ability of executives at
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to unload their stock in the years leading to the financial
crisis provided them with incentives to seek improvements in short-term results even at the
cost of an elevated risk of an implosion in the future).
63. Id. However, commentators disagree on whether poor incentives contributed to the
crisis. See, e.g., Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit
Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 22–23 (2011) (stating that bank performance during the recent
credit crisis is not related to CEO incentives before the crisis).
64. See Equilar, Inc., supra note 9 (reporting that, among proxy filings of one hundred
companies with yearly revenues of $12.5 billion or greater, tying long-term performance was
the most cited general strategy for mitigation of risk. Under this broad category, many of
such companies cited SOPs as a key element in reducing their risk. The second-greatest
percentage, 59% of companies, specifically disclosed that their SOPs contributed to their
mitigation of risk.).
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short-term and long-term incentives compensation, or policies like excess-pay
clawbacks65 and hedging prohibition.66
In addition to the goals that firms declare for their SOPs, these policies are
worth examining for three more reasons. First, they should help to tie pay to
performance. Second, other rules, policies, norms, incentives, or mechanisms that
could prevent managers from prematurely unloading stock are insufficient. Third,
SOPs cost less than other policies that constrain managerial stock unloading.
D. SOPs Help To Tie Pay to Performance
Because they can prevent managers from personally avoiding the negative
consequences of their firms’ stock implosion, SOPs create an important link between
pay and performance. When poor-performing managers are allowed to freely unload
their stock, they may avoid taking a loss if they sell their stock before its price declines.
Absent SOPs, managers who perform poorly may not only avoid losses but also
generate personal profits. First, as I explained in the previous subpart, excessively
risky strategies can generate profits for managers who may sell their stock
quickly.67 Second, the ability to enter into hedging transactions may create even
more opportunities for these managers to separate their pay from their performance.
For example, managers who increase short-term profits and instill latent risks may
not only sell their stock later but also hedge their risk ex ante by using a future
contract, which stipulates that they will sell some or all of their stock in the future
for a predetermined price.68 Because only the managers know about the latent risk
of implosion down the road, the future contract would not reflect this risk.
Therefore, these managers are able to lock up their personal short-term stock profits
and hedge against a potential stock plummet.
Finally, SOPs tie pay to risk management, which is an important aspect of
performance. This link is created because SOPs, by limiting managers’ ability to
unload stock, expose managers’ holdings to the long-term risk associated with the
stock price. Without SOPs, managers can take advantage of their superior
information by unloading their stock as a precaution against stock price volatility.
Conversely, with SOPs (and because of their risk aversion), managers are encouraged
to increase the stock price risk only if it creates an additional return that justifies it.

65. Only 50% and 56% of these firms, respectively, cite the use of clawbacks and the balance
of short-term and long-term incentives as part of their risk-management strategy. See id.
66. See supra note 31.
67. See, e.g., supra note 12 (discussing the perverse incentives that GM executive
compensation incentives created not to fix the faulty ignition switches in its Chevrolet Cobalts).
68. See generally David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal
Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (2000) (noting that
combining executive stock options together with derivatives raises a serious concern.
Options are supposed to motivate better performance by tying pay to the stock price, but
using derivatives for hedging can simulate a sale of such options without violating the
executive contract with the firm. Then the incentive justification for option grants would no
longer hold.).
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E. The Need for SOPs Despite the Existence of Vesting Schedules
Firms have universally adopted vesting schedules for their equity grants.69 Such
schedules stipulate that managers may “earn” their stock options or restricted stock
only in the future and only after certain conditions are met.70 Unless stock is
earned, it is nontransferable and certainly cannot be sold by the manager.
Nevertheless, well-construed SOPs are still important. Whereas both SOPs and
vesting schedules impose unloading restrictions on stock that has not yet been
earned by the manager, only SOPs define unloading restrictions for managerial
stock that has already been vested. Restricting managerial freedom to unload vested
stock is important both when managers sell their shares upon vesting and when
they hold their shares to sell at a later date.
First, if an executive sells all of his shares upon the vesting of his awards, his
tangible alignment with shareholder interests will significantly decrease. For
example, consider a newly appointed manager who is granted a fixed amount of
stock every year, which vests in three equal annual installments.71 This manager,
who sells all of his stock incentives upon their vesting, is expected to sell
two-thirds of his total stock awards by his fifth anniversary. Going forward, the
ratio of stock incentives that he unloads will increase even further.72
Without SOPs, replenishing such stock incentives is very expensive. This is
because, on average, stock-based compensation has reached an all-time high of
roughly 80% of total pay for executives, and such stock vests over a period of only
three to four years.73 Consequently, in order to replenish its CEO’s stock
incentives, the average S&P 500 firm will have to grant its executive new stock
worth almost $7 million per year.
If the firm wants to avoid incurring such a significant cost, it would be better off
imposing an SOP rather than extending its stock vesting schedules. Stretching
vesting schedules increases the period in which options or restricted stock do not
belong to the manager, thus making it costly for the manager who incurs the costs

69. See EQUILAR, INC., 2014 EQUITY TRENDS REPORT 15–17 (2014), available at
http://info.equilar.com/rs/equilar/images/equilar-2014-equity-trends-report.pdf.
70. For time-based vesting, all vesting periods are at least one year in length and a
three-year vesting period is the most common. For performance equity, long-term
performance metrics are the most common condition for vesting, with a growing popularity
of time-based vesting restrictions following such performance periods. See id. at 14–16.
71. Such a vesting schedule is in line with the common practice for vesting schedules.
For example, graded stock and option awards in S&P 1500 firms both had average vesting
periods of 3.6 years. See id. at 4.
72. If, for example, his annual stock grant is 100 shares, he will hold 200 unvested
shares at his fifth-year anniversary and will sell 400 shares by then. Going forward, every
following year he will sell another 100 shares and be granted the same amount of unvested
stock. Therefore, the amount of unvested stock he holds will remain 200 but the amount of
stock sales will increase by 100 shares every year.
73. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14; EQUILAR, INC., supra note 69, at 16 (reporting that
a three-year cliff and three- and four-year graded vesting schedules are the most popular
vesting periods).
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associated with the extended risk of never earning his unvested stock.74
Additionally, the manager will lose the time value of money resulting from pushing
his vesting date forward. Conversely, by requiring the manager to hold his
already-vested stock for the long term, an SOP merely limits the manager’s ability
to sell stock he already owns. Thus, imposing SOPs is cheaper than extending
vesting periods because it does not impose the extra risk associated with the
possibility that a future receipt of stock ownership rights will not occur. These extra
costs may be rolled over to shareholders.75
Second, when the manager does not routinely unload his stock incentives upon
vesting, well-construed SOPs become even more important because their
effectiveness in attaining the goals discussed earlier in this Part increases. For
example, unlike a manager who sells his stock upon vesting, a manager who
consistently avoids selling his vested stock76 may be more tempted to push his firm
to take excessive risks. If the gamble pans out and he keeps all of his vested stock,
its value will appreciate more than if he had sold some of it. But if the unnecessary
corporate adventure does not succeed, the manager will be able to avoid taking part
in his shareholders’ loss by quickly unloading the considerable amount of vested
stock that he still holds.
Consider David Zucker, Midway Games CEO. Between December 19, 2006,
and January 6, 2007, Zucker sold a total of 650,000 Midway Games shares for
$12.9 million. Between mid-December 2006 and late February 2007, Midway
Games stock lost almost 60% of its value.77 Unfortunately, Zucker is not the only
executive to unload a massive amount of stock when gambles do not seem to pan
out. The top five executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash
flows of about $1.1 billion and $850 million, respectively, from stock sales during

74. A manager incurs a significant risk that his unvested stock will never vest for
several reasons. For time-vested stock, the manager is not certain that he will remain with
the firm until such time lapses. This is a significant risk because the average CEO tenure
today is only eight years. See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 26. For performance-based
unvested stock, the manager is not certain that he will meet the performance criteria, which
are often largely dependent on factors beyond the manager’s control, such as stock market
performance, competitors’ performance, and pure luck.
75. A similar idea is that a shift of risk from the shareholders to a risk-averse CEO will
result in more compensation being paid by the shareholders to the CEO. See generally, e.g.,
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, but
How, HARV. BUS. REV., May 1990, at 138 (indicating that a shift of such risk, by tying more
pay to performance, may be desirable despite the increase in CEO pay).
76. My study shows that many CEOs keep significant amounts of their vested stock and,
more specifically, that the median S&P 500 CEO holds roughly $14 million worth of his
vested stock incentives.
77. Jane Sasseen, A Closer Look at Trades by Top Brass: Some Execs May Be Abusing
an SEC ‘Safe Harbor’ Rule on Insider Stock Sales, BUS. WK., NOV. 13, 2006, at 40
(describing how Zucker and other executives took advantage of the SEC rule known as a
10b5-1 plan to sell shares without facing insider-trading charges). Despite several conditions
that such plans should meet, the article cites evidence that executives who set up such plans
appear to be earning outsize gains.
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the eight years preceding their firms’ colossal crashes in 2008.78 Also, in a study of
executive trading in over 1200 firms during a five-year period ending in January
2006, Alan Jagolinzer found that insiders regularly sell on inside information and
thereby consistently generate above-market returns.79
Finally, regardless of whether the manager sells some of his vested stock,
restricting the sale of vested stock is more effective in changing managerial
incentives than restricting the unloading of unvested stock. Vested stock is worth
more for the manager than unvested stock because, as discussed before, stock vesting
is uncertain. Therefore, the manager’s inability to sell his vested stock when its value
decreases is more costly for him than refraining from selling an identical amount of
his unvested stock. In turn, a manager who is subject to effective SOPs will have a
greater incentive to avoid a long-term depreciation of his stock price compared to a
manager who is merely restricted by his vesting schedules.
F. The Insufficiency of Other Tools That Could Prevent Managers
from a Quick Stock Unwinding
In addition to SOPs and vesting schedules, there are other rules, policies, norms,
and incentives that could theoretically prevent managers from quickly unloading
their shares. However, such tools are insufficient to restrict the unloading of
managerial stock.
The most important of these alternatives is the ability of institutional
shareholders and directors to exert informal pressure to hinder executives’ stock
unwinding.80 There is evidence that institutional shareholders convey their views
on executive compensation to selected boards of directors privately.81 Institutions
also use informal negotiations backed by the threat of forcing a shareholder vote,
filing shareholder proposals, launching “Just Vote No” campaigns, and using other
activist efforts as a way to pry concessions out of companies.82

78. Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 260. In response, Fahlenbrach and Stulz suggest
that bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during
the crisis; however, even Fahlenbrach and Stulz do not deny consistent and comprehensive
selling by executives of their own firm’s equity. See Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 63.
79. Alan D. Jagolinzer, Sec Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI.
224, 232 (2009).
80. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
81. See James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institutional
Investor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 758 (1995).
82. See Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts
to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 167 (1995) (noting that “[l]arge private
investors, such as Kirk Kerkorian, and their influence on the operations of some of
America's largest corporations offer examples of investor power short of any vote or sale of
stock”). Now, when shareholders are entitled to a nonbinding “Say on Pay” vote on
executive compensation, they have more leverage to informally negotiate with management.
See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1999) (noting that since the
stratospheric increases in CEO pay of the 1990s, “[o]utraged investors have made their
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Among other mechanisms that could incentivize or require managers to hold
their firms’ stock for the long term are insider-trading rules. Practically, such rules
limit managerial unwinding of stock to predetermined short “trading windows”
following the release of quarterly earnings or, alternatively, to plans created before
the executive was in possession of material nonpublic information.83 On top of
these restrictions, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act aims to prohibit
fraud by requiring insiders to disgorge any “short swing” profits realized from any
purchase or sale of their firms’ securities within six months.84 In addition, federal
tax rules encourage executives to defer the sale of their restricted stock and to defer
the sale of their stock options.85
We would also think that managers would not sell much of their stock because
of their tendencies to be overconfident86 as well as their cognitive dissonance.87
Because of their cognitive dissonance and overconfident tendencies, CEOs can be
expected to hold more company stock than is desired from a portfolio
diversification viewpoint.
However, evidence shows that these existing mechanisms are not sufficient to
prevent executives from quick stock unloading. A 2012 study suggests that most
top executives at S&P 1500 firms sell equity at least once during their tenure, with
the median sale equal to 15% of the executive’s total holdings of his firm’s stock.88
Also, executives typically exercise their stock options years before those options

views known to corporate boards of directors using shareholder proposals, binding bylaw
amendments, ‘Just Vote No’ campaigns, and other activist efforts”).
83. See Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 463 (2011).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
85. For restricted stock, tax payments are deferred to the date that the stock is sold,
provided that the executive files a Section 83(b) election with the IRS within thirty days of the
grant date. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2 (2014). The grant of stock options is not a taxable event. If
the options are “qualified” (if the executive holds the shares for at least one year after the
exercise date and two years after the grant date of the stock) the employee pays nothing upon
exercise and pays capital gains only when eventually selling the stock option. See Brian J. Hall
& Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 53 (2003).
86. See Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate
Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2662 (2005) (reporting that CEOs are overconfident in the sense
that they systematically overestimate the return to their investment projects, and hence they
account for corporate investment distortions).
87. The theory of cognitive dissonance holds that contradictory beliefs compel the mind
to acquire or invent new thoughts or beliefs, or to modify existing beliefs, so as to minimize
the amount of dissonance between cognitions. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). Therefore, cognitive dissonance might cause managers to
reconcile their visions of themselves as successful managers with their fears of possible
challenges along the way by holding a significant amount of their firms’ stock for the long
term. Doing so would create new cognitions within consistent belief systems, according to
which (despite the challenges that they might face along the way) managers could believe
that their good abilities as managers would create value in the long term. A large body of
evidence from applied psychology shows that corporate executives routinely overestimate
their abilities. See generally, e.g., Malmendier & Tate, supra note 86.
88. See Ladika, supra note 19.
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expire, and almost all of the shares acquired through option exercises are
immediately sold.89
G. The Low Costs of SOPs
Theoretically, SOPs could be quite costly for shareholders. First, SOPs could
inflict liquidity costs on managers who need more cash in hand. Second, they could
force managers to hold undiversified personal securities portfolios and hence expose
managers to unnecessary idiosyncratic risk.90 In both cases, the costs would be rolled
over to the shareholders. Finally, SOPs could inflict direct costs on shareholders by
discouraging managers from taking necessary and appropriate risks.91
However, in reality, SOPs impose low costs. There are practical and theoretical
reasons for this conclusion. As a practical matter, my data from this study reveal
that the average S&P 500 CEO voluntarily holds almost three times his SOP
threshold, or some $14 million of his firm’s stock.92 This indicates that CEOs
typically choose to hold significant amounts of their firms’ stock despite the costs
associated with such activity. Theoretically, the high personal wealth of S&P 500
CEOs, resulting in part from their high compensation levels, can explain why their
voluntary choice to hold a significant amount of their firms’ stock costs them little
in the way of diversification and liquidity. Wealthy people tolerate risk
significantly better than others because a marginal loss of wealth reduces their
utility less than it does for less affluent people.93 In addition, their need for liquidity
is relatively low because their marginal propensity to consume is low and more of

89. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27, at 176–77 (noting studies that demonstrate
executives’ widespread freedom to unwind early, and executives’ tendency to exercise their
options and sell the underlying shares well before the options’ expiration).
90. For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model predicts that optimal diversification of
risk should be measured relative to a comprehensive “market portfolio” that includes all
traded financial assets as well as human capital and other assets. Therefore, managers, who
have their human capital invested in the firm, should hold a small fraction of their financial
portfolio in the firms’ stock. See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A
Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
91. One of the rationales for stock-based compensation (and especially option
compensation) is to make risk-averse managers more likely to take risks so that their
incentives will be better aligned with those of their typically risk-neutral shareholders.
Because options value increases with firm volatility, they are purported to give executives
incentives to increased risk-taking. See generally Randolph B. Cohen, Brian J. Hall & Luis
M. Viceira, Do Executive Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking? (Mar. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/lviceira/cohallvic3.pdf.
92. I obtained such data from the most recent information posted on the SEC website by
all S&P 500 firms as of August 4, 2010. I specifically recorded each CEO’s actual holdings
from his firm’s “Common Stock and Total Stock-Based Holdings” table in its proxy statement,
counting only such holdings recognized by the counting policy that applies to the CEO.
93. Almost three hundred years ago, Nicholas Bernoulli argued that the marginal utility
of wealth decreases as wealth increases, a view that is at the core of most conventional
economic theory today. This view holds that the disutility from losing an additional dollar
would decrease with wealth. ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A
FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 12–13 (2008).
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their basic human needs have already been met. Also, CEOs’ cognitive dissonance
and overconfident tendencies can exacerbate their propensity to hold stock even
more than their low risk aversion and low liquidity needs can support.94
II. THE WAVES OF SOP ADOPTIONS
The importance of SOPs was not widely recognized in the 1990s, so their
adoptions lagged behind the tectonic surge in stock-based compensation.
Specifically, only about 35% among the top 250 companies disclosed SOPs in
2001.95 Managers took advantage of their freedom to unload their incentive
compensation. For example, when managers exercised options to acquire stock,
they sold nearly all of it. Consequently, the dramatic boom in stock-based pay did
not translate into a significant increase in managerial ownership.96
The corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 emphasized the importance of SOPs.
This recognition was triggered by the massive stock sale of former Enron president
Jeffery Skilling. Skilling unexpectedly resigned in August 2001, and shortly
thereafter sold large blocks of his Enron stock before Enron declared bankruptcy.97
Skilling was later convicted of multiple federal felony charges relating to Enron’s
financial collapse and is now serving a twenty-four-year, four-month prison
sentence.98 The corporate scandals and increased investor attention that followed,
coupled with SEC requirements to increase transparency of compensation
disclosure, led to a surge in the number of formal SOPs in 2002.99 Specifically,
49% of Fortune 250 companies disclosed formal SOPs for their executives in 2002,
representing a 37% increase from 2001.100
As recognition of the need for SOPs gained traction, pro-business organizations,
such as the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, declared SOPs to
be a “best practice.”101 In addition, a 2003 report by The Conference Board (the

94. See supra notes 86–87.
95. See FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., STOCK OWNERSHIP POLICIES: PREVALENCE AND DESIGN
OF EXECUTIVE AND DIRECTOR OWNERSHIP POLICIES AMONG THE TOP 250 COMPANIES 5 (2003),
available at http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/FWC_Stock_Ownership_09.03.pdf.
96. See Ofek & Yermack, supra note 48, at 1383.
97. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Former Head of Enron Denies Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 2001, at C1; Enron CEO Skilling Quits, CNN MONEY (Aug. 14, 2001, 5:16 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2001/08/14/companies/enron/; Enron Files for Bankruptcy, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2001, 5:08 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1688550.stm.
98. Carrie Johnson, Skilling Gets 24 Years for Fraud at Enron; Former Workers Tell of
Hard Times Over Lost Jobs, Retirement Savings, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at A1.
99. See FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., supra note 95, at 5.
100. Id.
101. See THE ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (2007) (The Chamber of Commerce endorsed the hold-pastretirement Aspen Principles, which state that “senior executives [should] hold a significant
portion of their equity-based compensation for a period beyond their tenure.”); BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY 1 (2003); CFA
CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, BREAKING THE
SHORT-TERM CYCLE: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS,
ASSET MANAGERS, INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE 9
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leading independent business research organization in the United States) endorsed
SOPs, stating that the long-term focus they promote “may help prevent companies
from artificially propping up stock prices over the short term to cash out options
and making other potentially negative short-term decisions.”102 This increased
recognition of SOPs’ importance resulted in their prevalence among Fortune 250
firms reaching 69.7% in 2005103 and 82.1% in 2008.104
The 2008–09 financial crisis made the need to adopt SOPs unavoidable.105
Prominent government officials made public statements urging firms to adopt such
policies,106 and the federal government prescribed strict SOPs for all Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients.107 Since then, institutional shareholders
have used this momentum to exert unprecedented pressure on firms, urging them to
adopt SOPs and submitting numerous stockholder proposals.108 Even the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest public pension fund in the
United States, has declared that SOPs should be adopted universally.109
The world’s leading provider of proxy voting and corporate governance
services, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),110 has supported shareholder
(2006) (recommending that companies require executives and directors to hold meaningful
amounts of stock so that it is “economically material to the individual that a company
succeed in the long-term”).
102. THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2003).
103. EQUILAR, INC., 2007 EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES REPORT 3 (2008).
104. EQUILAR, INC., 2009 EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES REPORT 5 (2010).
105. This consensus was formed despite disagreements about the causes of crisis. See
supra note 63.
106. See supra note 3.
107. Specifically, the Treasury regulations preclude TARP recipient executives from
cashing out any of the stock they receive before their TARP funds are repaid. See
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (2012).
108. For example, shareholder proposals seeking to require executives to adopt strict
SOPs were the second most frequent compensation-related topic in 2013. “Thirty-four such
proposals have been voted on . . . , receiving average support of 24.4%.” Memorandum from
Gibson Dunn, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season 8 (July 9,
2013). The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations has been
particularly active in filing stockholder proposals pursuant to Section 14a-8 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, encouraging companies to adopt SOPs. It has filed such
proposals in a handful of TARP companies including Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank
of New York Mellon. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 79
(Mar. 15, 2010); Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 130 (Mar. 12, 2010);
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 40 (Mar. 31, 2010). For
stockholder proposals in non-TARP firms, see, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., Proxy Statement
(Form DEF 14A) 48 (Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing a stockholders proposal pushing Dow
Chemical to adopt a policy requiring that senior executives retain at least 75% of net
after-tax shares acquired through equity compensation programs until two years following
the termination of their employment).
109. THE CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 68 (2010) (stating that “equity ownership guidelines and
holding requirements should be an integral component of company’s equity plan and
overall compensation philosophy”).
110. “For nearly 30 years, ISS has been the leading provider of governance research to
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pressure. It has done so by (1) advising shareholders to vote for stockholder
proposals that push companies to adopt SOPs,111 (2) rewarding firms that have
SOPs on its newly debuted risk assessment system,112 and (3) recommending that
shareholders vote on “Say-on-Pay” for firms with SOPs.113 Because ISS has a
tremendous influence on firms, its support in shareholder pressure is expected to
play a decisive role in pushing firms to adopt SOPs.114
Leading business executives, such as Goldman Sachs’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein,
have come up with their own proposals to adopt strong SOPs,115 and leading

institutional investors . . . [serving] approximately 39,000 companies across 115 countries.”
Governance Advisory Services, ISS GOVERNANCE, http://www.issgovernance.com
/governance-solutions/governance-advisory-services/.
111. See RISKMETRICS GRP., 2010 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 51–52
(2010), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/RMG_2010_US_Summary
Guidelines20100225.pdf.
112. Such a risk assessment system is called Governance Risk Indicators (GRId). GRId,
which debuted on March 10, 2010, allows investors to assess their firms’ level of corporate
governance risk. Scores are based on each company’s policy relative to what ISS views as
“best practice” in the relevant global market. Answers are converted into numerical values
using a grading system determined by ISS, and the results are converted into overall scores and
levels of concern (e.g., low, medium, and high) in each of four areas. Generally, GRId’s
scoring for a question will be based on a scale of “–5” to “+5,” with “0” being a neutral score.
Scores are then normalized on a 100-point scale (e.g., 0 to 100). GRId includes twenty-eight
compensation indicators, four of which exclusively discuss SOPs. Companies failing to
disclose, or explicitly saying that they will not disclose, receive the lowest score on GRId,
thereby receiving higher corporate governance risk assessment. See Hewitt, supra note 5.
113. Current ISS proxy voting summary guidelines urge shareholders to favor firms with
robust SOPs when they cast their votes on Say-on-Pay. The guidelines state that shareholders
should consider robust SOPs as an important factor that mitigates the impact of risky pay
incentives. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. INC., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING
SUMMARY GUIDELINES 40 (Jan. 13, 2014), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file
/files/ISS2014USSummaryGuidelines.pdf.
114. For example, in 2012 firms fortunate enough to receive an ISS “for” recommendation
on Say-on-Pay received 95% shareholder support, whereas firms that received an “against”
recommendation received only 65% support. John D. England, Say on Pay Soul-Searching
Required at Proxy Advisory Firms, in PAY GOVERNANCE LLC, EXECUTIVE PAY AT A TURNING
POINT: DEMONSTRATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE & OTHER BEST PRACTICES IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 65, 65–66 (Ira T. Kay ed., 2nd ed. 2012). Therefore, companies often tailor their
policies to meet ISS guidelines, and firms lobby for ISS support to fend off shareholder
proposals. The relentless efforts that former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carli Fiorina has made to
gain ISS support in the Hewlett-Packard-Compaq merger demonstrates the decisive importance
of ISS. See Pui-Wing Tam & Gary McWilliams, H-P Garners Major Endorsement of Deal:
ISS Advisory Firm Backs Acquisition of Compaq; Vote Seen as Still Close, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6,
2002, at A3 (reporting that “many money-management firms take ISS’s reports into account
before voting in a proxy battle”).
115. In a 2010 hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Blankfein declared
that senior executive officers should be required to retain the bulk of the stock they receive
until they retire and that stock delivery schedules should continue to apply after the
individual has left the firm. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FIRST PUBLIC
HEARING 6–11 (2010) (statement of Chairman and CEO Lloyd C. Blankfein of Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc.).
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ure 1. SOP preevalence amongg Fortune 250 U.S. firms, 20001–13
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stringent requirements on CEOs compared to the other members of the executive
team or the nonemployee directors.
I obtained most of my data from the most recent information posted on the SEC
website by all S&P 500 firms as of August 4, 2010. The SOP terms I collected
from the firms’ “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” chapters of their proxy
statements are the following: declared goals, target thresholds, counting policies,
phase-in periods, and sanctions. In order to analyze the firms’ counting policies, I
coded each policy according to its counting of the following parameters: vested
stock, vested options, deferred compensation, unvested stock, and unvested
options. I further used each firm’s proxy statement to record CEO actual holdings,
which I obtained from the “Common Stock and Total Stock-Based Holdings”
tables, counting only the stock-based holdings that apply to the CEO.
I also relied on some data outside the information disclosed in the firms’ proxy
statements, such as data available on the firms’ websites. In addition, I recorded share
prices from Google Finance and determined CEO tenure for each firm using data I
obtained from the Compustat ExecuComp database also as of August 4, 2010.
Finally, I calculated the percentage of vested equity that each SOP allows its
CEO to unwind. I did so by applying the following formula:
(vested equity – target threshold + min (target threshold, unvested
equity that may be counted for satisfying the SOP)) / vested equity
IV. THE DESIGN OF SOPS
Before analyzing the ineffectiveness and lack of transparency of SOPs, it is
important to explain how these policies are designed. I find that 94% of recent
SOPs disclose a target ownership framework while only 6% invoke a framework
that requires ongoing stock retention.
A. The Target Ownership Framework
This common SOP framework calls for CEOs119 to maintain minimum
ownership of their firms’ stock, typically valued at a certain multiple of their base
salary, as long as they serve in their current positions. The target threshold
framework also includes a counting policy, which describes the type of stock that
may be counted to satisfy its specified ownership threshold. Finally, the framework
contains a phase-in period term, which specifies the number of years the executive
has to attain his or her required stock threshold.120

119. SOPs and their target thresholds generally apply to senior executive officers and all
nonemployee directors. Because my analysis focuses on CEOs, I ignore all other SOP
objectives, such as target ownership thresholds for nonemployee directors that are specified
as a multiple of their regular annual cash retainer.
120. A detailed SOP is described in Johnson & Johnson’s 2010 proxy statement: “[T]he
Chairman/CEO is required to directly or indirectly own Company Common Stock equal in
value to five times his or her annual salary. . . . Stock ownership for the purpose of these
guidelines does not include shares underlying stock options. Individuals subject to these
guidelines are required to achieve the relevant ownership threshold within five years after
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I Figure 2, thhe distributionn of target ow
In
wnership levells of SOPs thaat employ succh a
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Almost two-thirds (62%) of CEOs are allowed to unload all of their vested stock
immediately,125 and the dollar amount of this capability is significant. In particular,
half of CEOs are allowed to sell more than $14 million worth of their vested stock
(which equals to more than 2.75 times their SOP target threshold), and 35% of
CEOs are allowed to sell more than $30 million worth of their vested stock.
Yet there is considerable variation in the effectiveness of SOPs. While the vast
majority of policies are extremely ineffective, there are some that do not allow
CEOs to sell significant amounts of their vested stock.126 A few points are worth
noting here. First, these strong policies are driven by the use of the uncommon,
ongoing retention framework.127 Second, among standard SOP frameworks, those
that tend to be effective impose strict counting policies—namely, they do not
recognize unvested stock.128 Third, and to a lesser extent, some stringent SOPs do
not have strict counting policies or a retention framework, but rather use high base
salary multiples.129 Lastly, some SOPs appear effective because of circumstantial
factors that are unrelated to their design, such as CEOs who choose to keep small
amounts of vested stock.130 Such relatively small stock holdings strongly correlate
with a short CEO tenure.
Some SOPs allow CEOs to unload a significant percentage of their vested stock
not because those policies are weak but because those CEOs hold significant
amounts of vested stock voluntarily, significantly above what their SOPs require
them to hold.131 In such cases, however, it is hard to think of a compelling
explanation for why these SOPs are necessary. Even more puzzling, it is hard to
explain why firms advertise these unnecessary policies so aggressively.

125. This result is based on a sample of 155 CEOs who already have to comply with their
SOPs and whose policies can be evaluated. Of all the firms included in the S&P 500 index,
only 283 firms disclose counting policies. Therefore, only these firms’ policies can be
evaluated. Of the CEOs of these firms, only 147 CEOs have phased-in policies; another eight
firms disclose retention policies that do not require phase-in terms.
126. Such effective SOPs are mostly those of financial firms, including Goldman Sachs
and JPMorgan. See supra Part IV.B.
127. See supra Part IV.B.
128. Aetna, an American managed health care company, established a stringent counting
policy. It strictly defines ownership as including “shares owned and vested stock units but
not stock options or [Stock Appreciation Rights].” Aetna Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A) 51 (Apr. 12, 2010).
129. General Dynamics, an American aerospace and defense company, established a
stringent SOP requiring its officers to “retain Common Stock until they own outright shares
with a market value ranging from eight to 15 times their base salary depending on the
officer’s position.” Gen. Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Mar. 19,
2010). A fifteen-times-base-salary multiple for the CEO is extremely high considering the
norm of five-times multiple for CEOs. See supra Figure 2.
130. For example, Hershey CEO David West holds, as of March 8, 2010, only 2.7 times his
base salary and hence is required to accumulate shares equal to five times his base salary by
October 2, 2012. The Hershey Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 61 (Mar. 22, 2010).
131. Michael Dell, Dell’s founder, chairman, and CEO, holds more than 11% of the
company’s stock, which amounts to 461 times his holding requirement. Therefore, his SOP
allows him to sell more than 99% of his stock. See Dell Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEA
14A) 38, 48 (May 27, 2010).
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Now, I analyze how SOPs fail to require CEOs to hold on to their firms’ stock
as a function of policy design.
A. Failure To Adopt the Ongoing Retention Framework
Despite the significantly enhanced effectiveness that the ongoing retention
framework provides, my analysis shows that only about 4% of SOPs use holding
period requirements and less than 2% employ a stock retention approach. These
SOPs are significantly more effective than common SOPs as they allow CEOs to
sell a dramatically lower percentage of their vested stock.
Consider the rare retention SOP adopted by Goldman Sachs:
[E]ach of our Senior Executives . . . is required . . . for so long as he
holds such position, to retain sole beneficial ownership of a number of
shares of Common Stock equal to at least 75% of the shares he has
received under our [Stock Incentive Plan] since becoming a Senior
Executive.132
As opposed to the common target ownership framework SOP, which uses a
five-times-base-salary multiple, the target threshold of Goldman’s SOP is
equivalent to more than ninety-five times the $600,000 base salary of its chairman
and CEO Lloyd Blankfein. This multiple will increase over time as soon as
Blankfein, who started serving as Goldman’s senior manager in April 2002, is
awarded more stock-based incentives.
Consider the rare holding-period approach endorsed by Exxon Mobil’s SOP:
“50 percent of each grant is restricted for five years;” and “[t]he balance is
restricted for 10 years or until retirement, whichever is later.”133
For Rex Tillerson, who was elected chairman and CEO of Exxon Mobil in 2006,
the stock subject to SOP is equal to thirty-nine times his base salary, compared to
only five-times-base-salary multiple for the median CEO. Moreover, Tillerson’s
percentage of vested stock free to unwind is as low as 12%, dramatically lower than
the 100% freedom to unwind for the median CEO.134
The vast majority of SOPs that employ a target ownership framework not only
fail to require ongoing retention of stock after their ownership levels are met but
also fail to invoke an RHT approach, which guides CEOs to retain stock before
such levels are attained. RHT policies use retention rates ranging from 25% to
100%, with almost half of them (twenty-one policies) requiring a 100% retention
rate.135 Dun & Bradstreet discloses such an exceptional policy: “[A]ll executives

132. The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., supra note 50, at 41. Citigroup, JPMorgan, and
Morgan Stanley adopted similar policies. See Citigroup Inc., supra note 108, at 64;
JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 108, at 26–27; Morgan Stanley, supra note 116, at 19.
133. Exxon Mobil Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEA 14A) 30 (Apr. 13, 2010)
(emphasis in original).
134. Id.
135. The retention rates of the remaining twenty-six RHT policies are distributed as
follows: seven policies require a 75% rate, nine require a 50% rate, two require a 30% rate,
and eight require a 25% rate.
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1336. The Dun & Bradstreet Coorp., Proxy Staatement (Form DEA 14A) 35 (Mar. 25, 20100).
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The impact of counting unvested stock on SOP effectiveness should not be
surprising. The average SOP requires the CEO to hold five times his base salary in
five years, counting both unvested and vested stock to satisfy this threshold. CEOs
earn, on average, a $1 million annual base salary, and each year they receive some
$6 million grant of stock that vests gradually over three years.139 Thus, starting in the
beginning of their third year of stock grants, CEOs will hold, on average, $12 million
worth of unvested stock, which they do not own yet but can nevertheless apply
toward their average $5 million SOP requirement. Hence, the counting policy that
recognizes unvested stock may easily render an SOP entirely ineffective.
This focus on policies that allow the counting of unvested stock shows that such
policies render most SOPs entirely ineffective for all levels of CEO tenure, even for
CEOs who have not phased in yet. Also, the median amount of unvested stock
exceeds SOPs’ target threshold for all levels of CEO tenure. Table 1 summarizes
the pervasive power of counting unvested stock in rendering SOPs ineffective.
Table 1. The effect of counting unvested stock on SOP effectiveness for S&P 500 CEOs,
2010

Number of
policies
26
30
39
95

Years after CEO
phased in

Unvested stock /
target threshold
(median)

Likelihood of
counting policy to
render SOP
completely
ineffective

(–2) to 0
0 to 2
3 or more
All

1.49
1.01
1.26
1.16

62%
50%
62%
58%

Sample: Ninety-five SOPs that count unvested stock, disclose their phase-in policies, and
give their CEOs two years or less to phase in.

Dell, one of 164 firms that allow the counting of unvested stock, acknowledges
that the pervasive market norm of counting unvested stock has influenced its
decision to do the same.140 Dell explicitly indicates that its lax counting policy
follows the market:
Unvested restricted stock, [Restricted Stock Units] and
[Performance-Based Restricted Stock Units] (earned) may be used to
satisfy these minimum ownership requirements, but unexercised stock
options and awards subject to a performance requirement may not. Dell
believes these ownership guidelines to be in line with the prevalent
ownership guidelines among peer companies.141

in 401(k) accounts, deferred compensation, and stock in trust accounts.
139. EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14.
140. Despite the fact that Michael Dell holds more than 11% of the company’s stock,
Dell’s other top executives and nonemployee directors can take advantage of the company’s
ineffective SOP.
141. Dell Inc., supra note 131, at 38.
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C. Lax Target Ownership Levels
For most CEOs, SOP target ownership levels are lower than 50% of their annual
total pay and even lower than their single-year stock-based compensation.142 Only
3% of SOPs use a base salary multiple that requires CEOs to hold more than their
single-year total pay.
The common practice of lax target thresholds renders many SOPs futile as soon
as they are adopted. According to a 2011 study, “71% of the CEOs already have a
multiple larger than the target by the time the guidelines are initiated.”143
D. Phase-In Policies Suspend Many SOPs
Phase-in policies render 43% of SOPs inapplicable. The reason for this is that
CEOs are expected to attain their target ownership levels only after serving five
years in their positions. Because the median CEO tenure of S&P 500 CEOs in my
survey is just 5.01 years,144 almost half of CEOs are not required to hold any stock
yet, solely because of their firms’ feckless phase-in policies. In addition, virtually
all phase-in policies do not invoke an RHT approach, which requires an ongoing
accumulation of stock before CEOs hit their target ownership thresholds.
The bottom line result I reported earlier, according to which almost two-thirds of
CEOs are allowed to unload their stock immediately, is underestimated as it does
not take into account the 128 CEOs who have not phased in yet. When those CEOs
are included, the percentage of CEOs who are allowed to immediately unload all of
their vested stock and still comply with their SOPs jumps to almost 80%.145
E. CEOs Are Allowed To Nullify Their SOPs Through Hedging
A “perfect hedge” nullifies the incentives provided by holding stock pursuant to
an SOP. It does so by stripping the upside and downside risks associated with stock
price movements in exchange for a predetermined cash flow that is not affected by
the firm’s future stock price or performance. Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon document

142. This outcome results from the fact that some 80% of SOPs require CEOs to hold
five times their base salary or less, while the average S&P 500 CEO is paid a $1 million base
salary and his total compensation is some $10.1 million, $8.1 million of which is in the form
of stock-based compensation. EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14.
143. Ying Cao, Zhaoyang Gu & Yong George Yang, Adoption of Executive Ownership
Guidelines: A New Look 13 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596503.
144. This finding is in line with the fact that the average tenure of a departing S&P 500
CEO in the United States was only eight years in 2010. THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 26.
145. The calculation goes as follows: the population of all SOPs that can be evaluated
(those with clear counting policies) is 283, compared with only 155 policies of CEOs who
have phased in. Ninety-six out of the 155 phased-in CEOs, as well as the 128 non-phased-in
CEOs, are allowed to sell all their stock immediately. The total of 128 plus 96 divided by
283 (79.2%) is the sum of the CEOs who are allowed to sell 100% of their vested stock and
still be in compliance with their SOPs.
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that many managers use zero-cost collars and equity swaps146 to hedge the risk
associated with their equity holdings.147 Managers even possess some timing
abilities; that is, they can initiate hedging transactions immediately following large
price run-ups and prior to poor earnings announcements.148
To demonstrate how a zero-cost collar transaction may nullify an SOP, consider
an SOP that requires an executive to hold 50,000 shares of his firm’s stock for the
long term; consider further that the stock currently trades at one hundred dollars.
This leaves the executive exposed to future losses of up to $5 million if his firm’s
stock price drops and poised to earn an unlimited potential profit if that price
increases. This balance between potential gains and losses should incentivize him
to avoid taking excessive risks and to work hard to maximize the long-term stock
price. However, if he wishes to fully hedge his SOP stock by purchasing a
zero-cost collar, he can buy 50,000 put options and sell 50,000 call options with a
strike price of one hundred dollars for each option. This hedge fully protects him
from any increase or decrease in his firm’s stock price because the exercise of the
call (put) options will nullify any positive (negative) cash flow associated with any
future increase (decrease) in stock price. The economic incentives provided by this
hedge are equivalent to the sale of his 50,000 SOP stock. His SOP holdings
therefore no longer provide him with any economic incentives.149
I find that only the few SOPs that employ retention frameworks and another two
SOPs that use the common target ownership framework do not count shares subject
to hedging.150 Although firms are now required to disclose more of their
executives’ derivative transactions,151 the law does not prohibit executives from
hedging their stock. Therefore, they may freely weaken or undo their SOPs by
entering into hedging transactions.
My results for overall SOP ineffectiveness are probably again underestimated
because I do not account for possible CEO hedging activity. A future work should
analyze the impact of actual hedging transactions on the ineffectiveness of SOPs.

146. Zero-cost collar strategies involve the simultaneous purchase of a put option and
sale of a call option covering the firm’s shares so that both costs cancel each other out. An
equity swap is a financial derivative contract in which two parties agree to exchange a set of
cash flows at set dates in the future. Equity swaps allow investors to exchange the future
returns on their stock for the cash flow of another financial instrument, such as a debt
instrument (e.g., the cash flows associated with the return of the London Interbank Offered
Rate) or any other financial instrument, such as the S&P 500. See J. Carr Bettis, John M.
Bizjak & Michael L. Lemmon, Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use
of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 345, 345 (2001).
147. Id. at 359–71 (indicating that zero-cost collars and equity swaps involve high ranking
insiders and cover over a third of their equity holdings).
148. Id. at 347.
149. See Schizer, supra note 68.
150. Firms that invoke retention policies also prohibit hedging by their executives. The
two firms in my sample that employ the common target ownership framework and do not
count hedged stock are Public Service Enterprise Group and SunTrust Banks.
151. See infra Part VI.C.1.b.
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F. Lack of Sanctions
Only rarely do SOPs disclose sanctions that may be imposed for breaching these
policies. In particular, more than 90% of policies in my study, or 379, have not
disclosed sanctions. A board of directors does not need a special authorization to
penalize SOP violators, as it has an inherent prerogative to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation.152 Still, having a binding sanction policy is important
because, for a variety of financial, psychological, and social reasons, boards cannot
be expected to initiate the penalizing of executives who breach the terms of their
SOPs.153 Therefore, the lack of sanctions delivers an implicit message to investors
that boards are not expected to take SOP violations seriously.154 In practical terms,
it can mean that SOPs are rendered aspirational rather than binding.
Moreover, the few disclosed sanctions generally do not impose meaningful
penalties; most (twenty-eight of forty-five) merely impose a partial prohibition on
future equity award sales,155 and many of them are framed in ways that leave such a
penalty to the discretion of the board of directors. Only in a very few cases, as with
Merck’s SOP, do firms penalize SOP violators by reducing their future equity grants.156
G. Suggestive Language
Many firms frame their SOPs in advisory rather than mandatory terms. That is,
their policies are not phrased to require their top executives and directors to follow
their SOPs but instead merely “call” their leadership team members to hold certain
stock in their firms. For example, Archer Daniels Midland’s SOP states that “[t]he
policy calls for members of senior management to own shares of common
stock.”157 Such language, along with the scarcity of sanctions, indicates that many
SOPs are not designed to be binding.
VI. SOP INEFFECTIVENESS IS CAMOUFLAGED
Firms camouflage the extreme ineffectiveness of their SOPs in three ways: first,
they do not provide bottom-line information regarding the effectiveness of their

152. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (discussing the managing role of a
board of directors).
153. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27, at 23–44.
154. Jesse Fried and I report a similar pattern with voluntarily adopted clawback policies.
See Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 737–38 (2011)
(reporting that the vast majority of clawback policies adopted by S&P 500 firms leave
discretion to boards to forgo recovering excess pay even when the executive receiving such
pay committed misconduct).
155. Such an ineffective sanction is mentioned in Qualcomm’s SOP: “If a [Named
Executive Officer] has not met the guidelines by the deadline, we will require that the NEO,
upon a stock option exercise, hold at least 50% of the net shares remaining after required tax
withholdings, until they meet the minimum guideline.” Qualcomm Inc., Proxy Statement
(Form DEF 14A) 23 (Jan. 14, 2009).
156. Merck & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 31 (Mar. 13, 2009).
157. Archer Daniels Midland Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 5 (Sept. 25, 2009).
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policies; second, many do not disclose critical terms of their SOPs to their
investors; and third, when they do disclose critical terms, the implications of those
terms are not apparent.
Firms manage to camouflage the ineffectiveness of their SOPs in part because the
current disclosure rules, mandated by Regulation S-K,158 allow them to do so. Such
rules merely require them to disclose their SOP objectives159 in their proxy statements
and to provide a general description of their policies, including applicable amounts
and forms of ownership.160 Firms may also disclose information not required by
current disclosure rules. With SOPs, however, they seem to adopt a “lawyerly
approach” and reveal only the information they are required to disclose.
A. Firms Do Not Indicate the Overall Effectiveness of Their SOPs
Firms do not disclose bottom-line information regarding the effectiveness of
their SOPs. Specifically, they fail to report both the amount of vested stock that
their CEOs are allowed to unload going forward and the scope of historical
unwinding activity of stock recognized by their SOPs.
1. SOPs Fail To Indicate the Amount of Vested Stock
CEOs May Immediately Unload
I find that recent disclosures in firms’ proxy statements fail to indicate the
amount or the percentage of vested stock that CEOs may unwind according to their
SOPs. Because this amount of stock reflects the amount of incentive that the CEO
might have to deviate from SOP objectives, such information is the single most
important indicator that should be disclosed in order to facilitate informed investor
choice. In particular, as CEOs are allowed to sell more stock, their SOPs are less
effective in aligning their incentives with those of their shareholders, in curbing
their tendency toward excessive risk taking, and in incentivizing CEOs to focus on
long-term value maximization.
The lack of such disclosure not only is theoretically disturbing but also has a
clear, practical importance. Hiding the bottom-line ineffectiveness of SOPs
disguises the fact that most policies allow CEOs to sell all of the stock they own.
Moreover, this flaw cannot be rectified by having shareholders calculate these
numbers on their own. As I explain in subpart B below, even diligent and dedicated
outsiders are often unable to produce the bottom-line effectiveness numbers for
SOPs on their own.

158. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(xiii) (2013).
159. Item 402(b)(1) requires that “the discussion shall describe . . . (i) [t]he objectives of
the registrant’s compensation programs; [and] (ii) [w]hat the compensation program is
designed to reward[.]” § 229.402(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2011).
160. Item 402(b)(2) states that “examples of such information may include, in a given
case, among other things, the following: . . . (xiii) The registrant's equity or other security
ownership requirements or guidelines (specifying applicable amounts and forms of
ownership).” § 229.402(b)(2)(xiii) (2011).
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2. Firms Fail To Disclose Unwinding Activity of Stock Counted for SOP Purposes
Because SOP terms, such as counting policies, are commonly both vague and
potentially destructive for the effectiveness of these policies, knowing the bottom
line for actual unloading activity becomes very important. Unfortunately, investors
are not provided with information regarding how much stock recognized for SOP
purposes their CEOs unloaded in previous reporting periods.
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs disclosure
of stock-unloading activity related to insider trading, cannot substitute for specific
disclosures regarding such activity recognized by SOPs. Although Section 16(a)
requires CEOs, as well as other insiders, to report their individual stock purchases
and sales on Form 4 within forty-eight hours of such activity161 and to file an
annual statement of beneficial ownership of securities on Form 5,162 these
disclosures do not present a full picture of the stock-unloading activity that may be
counted for SOP purposes. This is because SOP counting policies commonly differ
from the counting of securities under Section 16(a).163
Knowing the historical unloading activity by CEOs of stock counted for their SOPs
would help investors evaluate the effectiveness of SOPs. Such information does not
only reflect the absolute strength of the policy but also the tendency of the CEO to take
advantage of potential weaknesses of the policy in order to unload stock. Hence, it
would help investors determine the need to modify the strength of such policies.
B. Firms Do Not Disclose Critical Terms of Their SOPs
Having shown that investors are not provided with an overall assessment of the
effectiveness of their SOPs, I now show that they are also not often provided with
enough information—specifically, about critical terms that determine the
functioning and effectiveness of these policies—to be able to form such an
assessment on their own.
1. Some 90% of SOPs Do Not Disclose Sanctions
Only 45 of the 424 firms in this study that disclose their SOPs specify sanctions,
which makes sanctions the least disclosed SOP term. Because Regulation S-K does
not require sanctions be disclosed, investors do not know whether this
nondisclosure is due to the lack of sanctions in the firms’ SOPs or to the firms’
choice not to disclose such sanctions.
Leaving investors in the dark as to the existence of sanctions is troubling. As
explained in Part V, the lack of binding sanctions sends a message that SOPs are

161. See 17 CFR § 249.104 (2012).
162. See 17 CFR § 249.105 (2012).
163. For example, I find that SOP counting policies differ greatly in the type of stock
they count. In addition to stock owned outright, they might include vested options, unvested
options, deferred stock, performance shares, stock units, stock in trusts, or stock owned by
family members. Section 16, in contrast, applies equally to all firms and requires reporting of
transactions in all equity securities of the firm, including derivatives, that the reporting
person beneficially owns.
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Because counting policies are crucial in rendering SOPs ineffective, the
nondisclosure of counting policies certainly precludes investors from evaluating their
SOPs. Concern over this finding increases if one considers that such nondisclosure
might present an adverse selection problem—namely, that firms that avoid revealing
their counting policies do so because they have the least effective policies. Still,
investors cannot simply assume that this is the case; rather, they need clear information.
3. Some 20% of SOPs Do Not Disclose Phase-In Policies
Almost one-fifth of SOPs do not disclose their phase-in policies. Unlike with
counting policies, Regulation S-K does not provide any specific guidance for phase-in
policy disclosure; instead, the applicable legal standard for such policies is a general
materiality test, according to which firms should consider whether their phase-in
policies should be disclosed as part of their general policy description.166 Many firms
choose to avoid disclosing their phase-in policies despite the great importance of such
disclosure for investors who are interested in evaluating the effectiveness of their
SOPs. Such importance results from the fact that, as I reported in Part V.D, as many as
43% of disclosed phase-in policies render SOPs inapplicable.
Comparing the disclosure rates of various policies reveals a selective disclosure
pattern: firms tend to be more aggressive in camouflaging critical provisions that may
render their SOPs more ineffective and may even provide more valuable information
to their investors. Based on my research, the most frequently hidden SOP component
is sanctions, despite the fact that the lack thereof can render SOPs entirely toothless.
The second most frequently hidden SOP component is counting policies, the
nondisclosure of which renders SOPs ineffective in 58% of cases. Finally, the least
frequently hidden component is phase-in policies, which provide the least valuable
information for investors; this is because only 43% of these policies render SOPs
ineffective and the variation across disclosed phase-in policies is the least significant.
Because critical SOP terms tend to be camouflaged, SOPs have not been included
in standard databases that financial economists use for research on executive
compensation.167 This, in turn, makes it harder for researchers and professional
investors alike to make a fast, systemic, and cheap assessment of these policies.
C. When Firms Disclose Critical SOP Terms, the Functioning
of Those Terms Is Not Apparent
The discussion in subpart B highlighted that firms frequently withhold
information about critical SOP terms that could allow investors to assess SOPs on
their own. In this subpart, I explain that when firms do disclose critical terms of
their SOPs, they do not indicate the impact of such terms on the effectiveness of
their SOPs. In addition, some critical SOP terms are disclosed in an obscure way
that might leave investors with the impression that these SOPs might not render
policies ineffective.

166. See supra text accompanying note 160.
167. For example, the popular S&P ExecuComp database does not include any of the
SOP terms.
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1. When Firms Disclose Critical SOP Terms, the Impact
of Those Terms Is Not Apparent
Firms commonly fail to disclose that some critical terms of their SOPs render
these policies entirely ineffective or significantly cripple them. The most important
examples are counting policies and hedging policies.
a. Firms Fail To Disclose How Counting Unvested Stock Affects Their SOPs
Despite the tremendous impact of counting policies on the effectiveness of
SOPs, my study shows that firms never indicate how their counting policies affect
the strength of their SOPs or whether allowing the counting of unvested stock
renders a policy ineffective. For example, in describing its counting policy, UPS
states that “[s]hares of class A common stock, deferred units and vested and
unvested [Restricted Stock Units] and [Restricted Performance Units] are
considered as owned for purposes of calculating ownership.”168
But UPS does not acknowledge that recognizing unvested Restricted Stock
Units (RSUs) and Restricted Performance Units (RPUs) renders its SOP entirely
ineffective for its CEO. It specifically does not disclose that its counting policy
allows its CEO to count his $12.3 million worth of unvested RSUs and RPUs to
satisfy his $8.4 million SOP commitment in full.
The detailed counting policy of KLA-Tencor suffers from a similar flaw:
“Unexercised options and unearned performance shares or units do not count for
purposes of measuring compliance with the ownership guidelines. The value of
unvested restricted stock or stock units is included in measuring compliance.”169
KLA-Tencor does not explain that this policy renders its SOP entirely
ineffective for its CEO, nor does it mention that the unvested restricted stock units
and the unvested performance share awards held by its CEO, Richard Wallace,170
equal more than four times Wallace’s SOP threshold. The implication of this
counting policy is that Wallace is in automatic compliance with his SOP without
holding even a single stock that he owns. However, as with UPS, this material fact
is not noted in the KLA-Tencor proxy statement.
b. SOPs Fail To Indicate the Effect of Hedging on Their SOPs
It is important for investors to know how a CEO’s actual hedging activity
interferes with the economic incentives allegedly provided by the firm’s SOP stock.
Firms argue that their SOPs tie managerial wealth to shareholder wealth over the long
term and that this is the mechanism by which their SOPs mitigate risk and encourage
long-term value creation.171 However, as I explained in Part V, CEOs may hedge
their SOP stock and thereby nullify the incentives provided by those policies.

168. See United Parcel Serv., Inc., supra note 18.
169. KLA-Tencor Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 59 (Sept. 27, 2012).
170. For Wallace’s unvested restricted stock units and unvested performance share
awards, see id. at 41.
171. See supra notes 36–39.
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Before the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which tightened the reporting obligations imposed
on firms with regard to the hedging transactions of their directors or employees, firms
were already required to report to the SEC any derivative transactions made by their
executives.172 Section 955 of Dodd-Frank extended the hedging reporting requirements
by requiring firms to disclose whether their directors and employees are permitted to
hedge any decrease in market value of the company’s stock.173
Still, firms are not required to—and never do—indicate how their managers’ stock
hedging affects their SOPs. This is particularly important because, as I reported in
Part V, only two firms in my sample do not count stock subject to hedging.
Therefore, fully hedged stock held by an executive is counted to satisfy his or her
SOP, but investors are kept in the dark regarding the existence of such stock.
2. Critical SOP Terms Are Confusing
The second reason why the functioning of critical SOP terms is not apparent is
that the framing of such terms is confusing, as can be seen primarily in the
disclosures of target ownership levels and of counting policies.
a. Target Ownership Levels Are Typically Obscure
The meaning of the term “salary” in describing the target ownership thresholds of
SOPs is confusing. The average policy, as I reported in Part IV, requires CEOs to
hold five times their base salary.174 However, some firms, such as UPS, use the term
salary or annual salary to describe the base salary multiple of their CEOs’ target
ownership levels.175 While for most employees salary means total compensation, it
means only less than 10% of total compensation for the average S&P 500 CEO.176
There is no a priori philological reason to assume that managers’ salary is
different from their total compensation. The exclusion of the stock-based portion of
executive pay from the definition of salary becomes even less intuitive when one
considers the SOP objective to translate the dramatic increase in stock-based

172. Forms 3, 4, and 5, pursuant to Sections 16(a) and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Sections 30(h) and 38 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, require
insiders to report holdings, acquisitions or dispositions of derivative securities. Specifically,
Form 3 should be filed after a company’s IPO, and report insiders’ initial derivative
securities holdings. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.103 (2013). Form 4 should be filed before the end of
the second business day following the day on which an acquisition or a disposition of a
derivative security has been executed. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (2013). Form 5 should be
filed annually, reporting insiders’ derivative securities holdings. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.105
(2013). For copies of the forms themselves, see Forms 3, 4, 5, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form345.htm.
173. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(j) (West 2012 & Supp. 2014).
174. I report only one firm, Chesapeake Energy, that includes the annual bonus as part of
its SOP salary multiple. This inclusion increases its SOP salary multiple from five to fifteen
times its CEO’s base salary.
175. The SOP of UPS states that “[t]arget ownership for the Chief Executive Officer is
eight times annual salary.” United Parcel Serv., Inc., supra note 18.
176. In 2013, the average S&P 500 CEO was paid a total compensation of some $10.1
million, while his base salary was $1 million. See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 14.
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compensation into managerial ownership. Therefore, using the term salary is not
only confusing but also likely to give investors an impression that their SOPs
function more effectively than they actually do.
b. Counting Policies Are Commonly Obscure
It is important for investors to know unequivocally when their SOPs allow the
counting of unvested stock. This is because counting unvested stock renders SOPs
completely ineffective in almost 60% of the cases and significantly weakens them
in the remaining 40%.
Nonetheless, firms that count unvested stock commonly camouflage this fact. In
particular, they frame the holding of unvested stock—stock not owned yet by the
executive—as “ownership,” as evidenced by the counting policy of AK Steel:
“‘[O]wnership’ includes . . . shares of Company restricted stock held directly by an
Executive Officer, whether or not yet vested.”177 AK Steel uses the word ownership
to describe unvested stock. Stating that ownership includes stock that is not yet
owned by the executive might confuse investors and prevent them from realizing that
such provisions significantly weaken SOPs and often render them entirely ineffective.
VII. THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF SOP INEFFECTIVENESS AND CAMOUFLAGE
Before proposing a regulatory reform to make SOPs transparent, it is important
to explain why the ineffectiveness of SOPs, and especially the camouflaging of
such ineffectiveness, is troubling.
A. SOP Ineffectiveness Prevents These Policies from Achieving the
Important Goals They Have Been Established To Attain
Because they are so ineffectual, SOPs are not likely to affect managers’
incentives and behavior. I reported in Part V that SOPs allow two-thirds of CEOs to
sell 100% of their vested stock immediately. Such CEOs are not any more likely to
shy away from taking excessive risks than are managers who do not have SOPs.
Similarly, SOPs do not curtail managers’ incentives to take other actions that those
policies were designed to discourage.
Evidence from the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis casts doubt upon
the efficacy of SOPs in curtailing managers’ incentives to take excessive risks,
even in the face of SOPs that are significantly more effective than recent ones.
Specifically, at that time Lehman Brothers178 had an SOP imposing a liquidity
limit, which prohibited its senior managers from unloading stock in any given year
in excess of 20% of their total equity holdings in the company (including
outstanding equity awards).179 Compared to recent SOPs, Lehman’s SOP was

177. See AK Steel Holding Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 37 (Apr. 12, 2010).
178. Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing in September 2008 triggered a widespread
panic that prompted a global financial crisis. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Susanne Craig,
Jeffrey McCracken & Jon Hilsenrath, The Two Faces of Lehman’s Fall—Private Talks of
Raising Capital Belied Firm's Public Optimism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008, at Al.
179. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEA 14A) 23 (Mar. 5, 2008).
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relatively strict. Nevertheless, the company’s top five executives sold Lehman stock
worth $1.1 billion between 2000 and 2008.180 This finding suggests that Lehman’s
SOP did not curtail its executives’ incentives to take excessive risks.181 If a 20%
annual unloading cap did not curb Lehman’s executives’ incentives to take
excessive risks, then the significantly weaker unloading limitations in recent SOPs
should fair much worse.182
Similarly, because they are ineffectual in preventing managers from unloading
their incentive compensation, SOPs are not likely to align managers’ interests with
those of shareholders. That managers are able to unload their stock poses the risks
not only that such stock will be sold and that managers will have less “skin in the
game” but also that managers will have incentives to act against shareholder
interests, as they do when they take excessive risks. Thus, ineffective SOPs do not
discourage such actions and sometimes even encourage them.
Finally, the ineffectiveness of SOPs precludes these policies from helping to tie
pay to performance. In the first part of this Article, I explained how SOPs could help
in this regard by decreasing managers’ ability to (1) avoid suffering personal losses
resulting from their poor performance, (2) generate personal profits despite their poor
performance, and (3) earn a salary that is not commensurate with their risk
management abilities. Because camouflaging the ineffectiveness of such policies
enables managers to engage with impunity in activities that SOPs were meant to
prevent, I conclude that SOPs do not live up to the expectations firms have created.
B. The Camouflage of SOP Ineffectiveness Misleads Investors
and Inhibits Attempts To Fix These Policies
While SOP ineffectiveness prevents these policies from attaining their
intended goals, the camouflaging of such ineffectiveness misleads investors to
believing that these policies actually achieve their goals. Specifically, when firms
tout their SOPs as a key element in their mitigation of risk and then camouflage
the inability of these policies to achieve that goal, they send mixed messages to
the markets and create confusion.
If the ineffectiveness of SOPs were transparent, outsiders would know that these
policies do not live up to the expectations firms have created and do not tie
managers’ wealth to that of long-term shareholders. Outsiders might mistakenly
believe that SOPs are effective enough to force managers to hold a significant
amount of their vested stock for the long term and that their stock holdings would
encourage them to maximize their firms’ long-term value.
However, because SOP ineffectiveness is camouflaged, investors tend not to
realize that these policies do not attain their goals; accordingly, investors are not

180. Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 268.
181. See id.
182. Certainly, Lehman’s aggressive culture contributed to its tendency to take excessive
risks. However, well-constructed SOPs should be tailored to achieve their goals and to take
into account the specific firm’s corporate culture, industry, market conditions, managerial
idiosyncratic situation, and so forth. Lehman’s SOP failed to do so, and its relative strength
compared with the strength of recent SOPs casts significant doubt on the efficacy of recent
SOPs to achieve such goals as well.
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inclined to consider possible responses to remedy this failure. Such responses
might include three courses of action. First, investors might conclude, after
weighing the potential costs and benefits of changing their SOPs, that these policies
should be more effective and therefore might push their firms to make SOPs
stronger. Second, investors might conclude that SOP ineffectiveness is optimal
considering the liquidity and diversification costs associated with having effective
SOPs and, in light of such costs, they might even decide that they prefer not to have
SOPs. Third, investors might decide that it is more cost-effective to attain SOP
goals by strengthening other policies. For example, to curb excessive risk taking,
investors might push for increasing the long-term portions of managerial incentive
pay or for reducing the convexity of executive pay arrangements by moving from
stock options to restricted stock pay.
The camouflage of SOP ineffectiveness and the illusion that these policies
achieve their goals not only inhibits shareholder action but also makes board action
unlikely. While the lack of transparency hampers investors’ abilities to make
accurate assessments of SOPs (and perhaps to pressure boards to change those
policies), it distracts boards of directors from understanding how these policies
function (or do not function). Without disclosure of credible and full information
about the functioning of SOPs, boards are unaware of the need to confer with their
executives about how SOPs should be designed. Currently, boards are unaware of
the potential need to improve their SOPs in order to fulfill the important goals they
are held to attain.
C. The Camouflage of SOP Ineffectiveness Suggests That Their Weakness
Is Undesirable
That the weakness of SOPs is camouflaged indicates that firms think that such
weakness, if it becomes transparent, will come across as undesirable; otherwise, firms
would disclose it. A decision to have an ineffective SOP or to avoid adopting an SOP
altogether is desirable when the personal costs that managers stand to incur if an
effective policy is adopted outweigh the potential benefits that shareholders stand to
gain. Because such managerial costs are likely to be rolled over to shareholders183—
for example, in the form of an increase in executive pay—a desirable decision to
render an SOP ineffective protects shareholders from incurring such costs.
However, if the weakness of SOPs were a selling point in markets, disclosure of
their ineffectiveness would be expected to increase stock price and firm value. This
is consistent with empirical studies that show that corporate governance terms that
benefit shareholders are associated with higher stock prices.184 Similarly, corporate
governance terms that do not benefit shareholders are associated with lower stock
prices.185 Therefore, firms’ choices to camouflage the ineffectiveness of their SOPs

183. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42.
184. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning
and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323
(2013) (reporting that the disappearance of the correlation between corporate governance
terms and stock returns in 2000–08 indicates that stock markets started in 2000 to accurately
price corporate governance terms).
185. Id.
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indicate that they think these policies decrease stock value and that their
transparency would result in a stock price decline.
D. SOP Ineffectiveness and Camouflage Indicate Managers’
Excessive Power vis-à-vis Shareholders
Adopting ineffective SOPs and camouflaging their ineffectiveness allows
executives to have the best of both worlds. Namely, it allows them to reap the
reputational gains associated with having effective SOPs without incurring the
personal costs associated with stringent SOPs.186 The camouflage of these policies
allows this to happen because it hides from investors the fact that managers should
not be rewarded with such reputational gains. Moreover, SOP camouflage makes it
unlikely that outsiders will exert pressure on firms to make their SOPs more effective,
which would, of course, force executives to incur the costs they seek to avoid.
Bebchuk and Fried explain that, for a variety of financial, social, and
psychological reasons, it is personally difficult for directors in public firms to
support compensation decisions that are costly for executives.187 This same
reasoning should explain why it is hard for directors in public firms to support pay
disclosures that stand to embarrass executives. For example, a director who was put
on the board by the CEO might feel uncomfortable proposing that the
ineffectiveness of the SOP, which is supposed to constrain the CEO, be made
transparent. In this way, executives have considerable power vis-à-vis directors.
Compared to other corporate policies, SOPs put directors in a greater conflict of
interest with shareholders. This is because directors are typically subject to SOPs
similar to the ones that apply to executives. Therefore, the interests of the
executives with regard to SOPs are aligned with those of their directors, which
makes the directors’ supervision of the executive team in order to protect
shareholders significantly harder. The weakness of directorial incentives to use
SOPs as an effective monitoring tool results in sacrificing shareholder interests for
the benefit of the executives and the directors themselves.
Excessive managerial power can also explain why firms tend to disclose their
SOP provisions selectively and camouflage those that render their policies more
ineffective. First, the transparency of provisions that render SOPs more ineffective
is more damaging to executives’ reputation. Second, making limp provisions
transparent increases the likelihood that outsiders will pressure firms to change
those provisions and impose direct diversification and liquidity costs on executives.
Excessive managerial power is also consistent with firms avoiding disclosure of
sanctions, which leaves significant room for board discretion. Because executives
possess significant power and influence over directors, it is likely that directors will
avoid penalizing executives for SOP violations. The phenomenon of allowing
board discretion in order to save executives from possible punishments is not

186. For a discussion of such liquidity and diversification costs, see supra Part I.
187. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 27 (describing sources of executives’ influence
over directors in public firms).
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exclusive to SOPs; it has also been shown that board discretion has been used to
forego clawbacks of excess pay from executives.188
VIII. MAKING SOPS TRANSPARENT
Having shown that the camouflaging of SOP ineffectiveness is fundamentally
troubling, I now explain why investors are not able to evaluate SOP effectiveness on
their own. First, as I explained in Part VI, even diligent and dedicated investors are
commonly unable to evaluate the bottom-line effectiveness of SOPs on their own.
This happens because firms do not disclose critical terms of their policies and because
when they do disclose such terms, the functioning of those terms is not apparent.
Second, even if critical terms are disclosed and their functioning is clear enough,
investors would have to make multiple calculations and assumptions and would often
end up with ambiguous estimations. For example, if they wanted information about
current CEO holdings pursuant to the CEO’s SOP, they would have to extract that
information from the “Securities Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and
Management” table in the firm’s proxy statement.189 However, this table is governed
by Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act and does not follow the SOP
framework. In particular, it includes stock held in 401(k) plans, in trusts, and by
family members, but many counting policies fail to address whether such stock
should be counted. Similarly, in order to calculate the unvested stock that might be
counted toward satisfying the SOP threshold, they would need to refer to the
“Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal Year-End” table in the firm’s proxy
statement.190 However, the distinctions that that table makes between various types of
unvested stock often do not align with the distinctions made by counting policies.
The inability of investors to analyze SOP disclosures in order to reach
unequivocal estimates of SOP functioning is similar to their inability to analyze
executive pay disclosures prior to the 1992 disclosure reform of executive
compensation. An SEC official describes the pre-1992 camouflage of the amount
and form of executive pay as follows:
The information was wholly unintelligible. . . . [T]he typical
compensation disclosure ran ten to fourteen pages. . . . [Y]ou might get
reference to a $3,500,081 pay package spelled out rather than in
numbers. That gives you an idea of the nature of the disclosures: it was
legalistic, turgid, and opaque; the numbers were buried somewhere in
the fourteen pages. Someone once gave a series of institutional investor
analysts a proxy statement and asked them to compute the
compensation received by the executives covered in the proxy

188. See Fried & Shilon, supra note 154, at 739 (reporting that boards can exercise
discretion to avoid clawbacks even if they determine that an executive has committed
misconduct, and explaining that requiring directors to recoup excess pay, without leaving it
up to the board’s discretion, is the only way to ensure that such recovery occurs).
189. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc., supra note 18.
190. Id. at 51.
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statement. No two analysts came up with the same number. The
numbers varied widely.191
The 1992 disclosure reform, which required the standardized compensation
tables that firms must now use, made camouflage more difficult. Such a disclosure
reform is similarly needed to make SOP camouflage harder.
Finally, because shareholders know ex ante that even diligent and dedicated
investors are unable to successfully evaluate SOPs and that such attempts will
usually produce ambiguous results, they might choose to save the costs associated
with evaluating SOPs and avoid engaging in this process. Because shareholders are
typically dispersed and each individual investor will have to incur the full costs of
evaluating an SOP but will benefit from only a fraction of its potential
improvement, shareholder efforts to evaluate SOPs suffer from a collective action
problem.192 Such a problem will discourage shareholders even more from
attempting to evaluate SOPs.
It is not only investors who are unable to successfully evaluate SOPs but also
the influential ISS, whose guidelines are followed by institutional investors and
firms alike.193 Unfortunately, firms can score high on ISS’s GRId despite their
grossly ineffective SOPs. According to GRId, when a policy requires a
six-times-base-salary multiple and a two-year holding period, it gets the highest
score.194 However, my analysis shows that GRId ignores limp counting policies,
phase-in periods, and sanctions, as well as hedging activity, and therefore does not
evaluate the bottom-line effectiveness of SOPs.
Because SOP camouflage is troubling, because shareholders are unlikely to
overcome camouflage by evaluating SOP effectiveness on their own, and because
the ISS does not do a good job at pressing firms to improve their SOPs, there is no
substitute for a regulatory intervention. Regulatory intervention may take different
courses. The most aggressive intervention would be implementation of mandatory
rules for SOP design. This option is not desirable, however, because there is no one
SOP prescription that fits all firms. The benefits of having SOPs vary greatly
according to firms’ propensity for risk and the magnitude of internal agency
problems. Other parameters, such as firm size, industry, and shareholder
composition and preferences, increase the variance in SOP benefits. The costs
associated with having SOPs vary significantly as well, depending on such

191. Symposium, Executive Compensation Under the New SEC Disclosure
Requirements, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (1995).
192. For investors, the term “collective action problem” describes the situation in which
multiple shareholders would all benefit from taking a certain action (such as exerting
pressure to improve their firms’ SOPs), but such action has an associated cost that makes it
implausible that any one individual would find it cost-effective to undertake this action
alone. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2nd ed. 1971).
193. When evaluating SOPs, the ISS GRId does not allocate points according to the
policies’ bottom-line effectiveness. See HEWITT, supra note 5. For a discussion regarding the
great influence that ISS has over institutional investors and firms, see supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
194. See id. at 37.
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idiosyncratic managerial characteristics such as the need for liquidity, voluntary
stock holdings, risk aversion, and portfolio composition.
A less intrusive policy suggests default SOP rules. Such rules are designed, on
the one hand, to allow market forces (to a certain extent) to tailor the desirable
policy to meet the needs and circumstances of each firm. On the other hand, they
are also designed to affect the outcome by setting up certain default standards.195
This course of action might be desirable for certain SOP elements that render these
policies feckless, such as counting policies or sanctions. However, as a first step, it
would be preferable to avoid dictating default rules and instead merely mandate
that SOPs become transparent; this course of action would allow market forces to
respond freely to such disclosures.
Making the ineffectiveness of SOPs transparent should allow shareholders,
boards, and policymakers to engage in a dialogue to improve SOPs according to
each firm’s individual characteristics and the needs of specific industries.196
Protecting investors by providing them with critical information about their
investments is the basic purpose behind securities regulation. Transparency is
particularly important in the case of SOPs because knowing whether these policies
accomplish what they were designed to accomplish constitutes critical information
for investors. Therefore, I turn to discuss a proposal to make SOPs transparent and
explain why such reform can be expected to start a process that will improve the
content of these policies.
A. Proposal To Reform Regulation S-K
1. Disclosure of SOP Bottom-Line Effectiveness
I propose to revise Regulation S-K to require disclosure of quantitative indices
for SOP bottom-line effectiveness. In particular, firms should be required to
disclose for each of their top five executives (1) the percentage and value of vested
and nonhedged equity that may be immediately unloaded, (2) the separate values of
vested and unvested equity held that are recognized by the firm’s SOP counting
policy, and (3) the percentage and aggregate value of equity sold and accumulated
during each of the previous three years. Whereas the first indicator highlights the
extent to which executives may use their freedom to unwind their equity grants, the
second indicator provides a clear picture of their SOP holdings, and the third
indicator provides information about the historical changes to their SOP holdings.
This quantitative information is crucial to enable investors to evaluate the
bottom-line effectiveness of their firms’ SOPs.
Once such bottom-line effectiveness indicators are disclosed, reputation
considerations are expected to push firms to improve their SOPs on their own;
however, such improvements will not necessarily increase the effectiveness of their
policies. Some firms might prefer to eliminate their SOPs altogether. This would be

195. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (explaining that default rules can change the outcome
because equilibrium can be path-dependent).
196. For example, bank regulators might be interested in imposing a special SOP regime
on bank executives because of the prominence of risk-taking incentives in this sector.
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desirable as well because it would put an end to all the feckless policies that are
incapable of accomplishing what they were designed to do.
2. Disclosure of Critical SOP Terms
In addition to providing indices for SOPs’ bottom-line effectiveness, firms
should be required to provide qualitative data about the functioning of their SOPs.
Here I focus on critical terms that have a major impact on SOP effectiveness. In
particular, the following additional information should be disclosed in firms’ SOP
narrative sections:
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

Counting policy and, specifically, the types of stock-based holdings
that are recognized for satisfying the policy requirements, with a
special emphasis on unvested stock and hedged stock. When a policy
allows the counting of unvested or hedged stock, it should specify the
amount of such stock that it recognizes and the percentage of its target
threshold that the stock satisfies.
Applicable phase-in policy, whether its top five executives have
already phased in, and whether the phase-in policy includes an RHT
provision.
Sanctions, if any, that executives face for violating their SOPs.
Any ongoing stock retention requirements.

Improved disclosure of SOP bottom-line effectiveness and critical qualitative
terms will, at a minimum, significantly improve the accuracy of investor
information and help to ensure that SOPs serve the important goals they were
designed to attain. Also, this reform will be inexpensive to implement because
firms generally have access to this information already197 and can undoubtedly
obtain it at a lower cost than can shareholders or researchers.198
B. Greater Transparency Should Improve SOPs
I expect that better transparency will improve the actual content of SOPs
because investors and boards not only will have a better understanding of what
these policies do but will also act on this information. Boards are expected to take
actions to improve SOPs regardless of the pressures they might face from their
shareholders. Currently, SOP camouflage keeps the problems associated with these
policies hidden from their directors, who are part-time nonemployees with limited
time and abundant responsibilities in which to perform their monitoring duties.199

197. For a detailed analysis of the low costs generally associated with mandatory disclosure
of the type I propose here, see generally Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in
Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007).
198. For an economic justification of mandatory disclosure grounded in the notion that
firms are the lowest-cost obtainers of most information relevant to securities valuation, see
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1047, 1048–49 (1995).
199. For example, Carter and Lorsch contend that since “the average director spends
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Because boards and compensation committees, even if loyal and dedicated, are
unable to analyze the hidden aspects of all corporate policies, making SOPs
transparent will provide them with the information they need to evaluate their SOPs
and will alert them to problems that are currently hidden.
Better transparency is expected to improve board action even when boards are
disloyal to investors. When SOPs become transparent, “outrage costs”200 will push
boards for SOP reform in order to avoid embarrassment and to avoid the social
costs associated with having SOPs that are incapable of achieving their declared
goals. Past experience indicates that social costs can significantly affect board
behavior. For example, boards were more likely to remove the executives
responsible for stock option backdating when there was greater media attention.201
In addition, better disclosure will encourage shareholder action because it will
provide shareholders with the processed information they need to successfully evaluate
SOPs. Having such information will also alleviate shareholder collective action
problems because shareholders will no longer need to expend considerable resources in
order to collect and process such information. And better disclosure will help
institutional investors identify systemic problems regarding SOPs in their portfolios and
evaluate proposed SOP reforms. Transparency across the board will make systematic
analysis available for institutions with a fairly modest investment of resources.
Finally, the 2006 SEC reform of executive pension disclosure serves as a
precedent for the kind of reform I propose for SOPs. In 2005, Bebchuk and Jackson
revealed that executive pension amounts were high and that they were being
camouflaged.202 Despite the fact that these findings were based on public filings,
the SEC agreed that a disclosure reform is warranted. Accordingly, in December
2006 the agency added a new rule, requiring that the value of pensions be made
transparent, thereby placing executive pension plans on investors' radar screens.
Following this reform, market prices responded and better reflected the real value
of executive pensions. In particular, investors expected a more conservative,
lower-risk operating strategy for CEOs who are entitled to larger executive pension
amounts. Therefore, bond prices increased, equity prices fell, firm risk decreased,
and value shifted from equity toward debt holders.203 Similarly, I expect that better
disclosure of SOPs will improve the informational efficiency of securities markets
and, hence, firms will be encouraged to improve the actual content of their policies.
little more than two weeks a year” on the job, it is difficult to “develop much more than a
rudimentary understanding of their companies’ workings.” COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W.
LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: DESIGNING CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD 45 (2004).
200. “Outrage costs” are the social and economic costs that managers suffer when
outsiders perceive certain pay arrangements as unjustified or even abusive. See BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra note 27, at 65.
201. See Margarethe F. Wiersema & Yan (Anthea) Zhang, Executive Turnover in the
Stock Option Backdating Wave: The Impact of Social Context, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 590,
595–96 (2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.2030/pdf,
(reporting that, during the 2006 stock backdating scandal, an increase of media attention to a
backdating scandal increases the likelihood that the firm experiences executive turnover).
202. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J.
CORP. L. 823 (2005).
203. See Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt
Incentives, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3813, 3832–41 (2011).
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The current camouflaging of SOP ineffectiveness is even more severe than that
of executive pensions before its disclosure reform of December 2006. This is
because, unlike the ability to use certain calculations and assumptions to estimate
the magnitude of executive pensions before December 2006, one-third of recent
SOPs cannot be evaluated at all, even if extensive assumptions are made.
C. Potential Objections to Making SOPs Transparent
Critics might argue that better disclosure will not be effective to improve the
content of SOPs because shareholders do not want their firms to adopt effective
policies. This is because most U.S. shareholders seek short-term gains and therefore
want managers to have short-term incentives.204 Based on the NYSE index data, the
mean holding period of U.S. investors in 1940 was around seven years; this stayed
the same for the next thirty-five years but has since fallen sharply to only around five
months.205 Moreover, “[s]hort-term trading has become the dominant force in the
U.S. capital market, accounting for about 78% of total dollar trading volume and
bringing total share turnover to more than 100% per quarter in recent years.”206
However, when it comes to corporate governance, institutional investors are more
relevant than short-term traders. Between 1991 and 2009, as direct individual
ownership in the United States fell from 60% of the market to 40%, institutional
investors became the dominant investors, and their prominence is set to continue.207
Institutional investors, and especially pension funds and life insurers, traditionally have
investment horizons that are tied to the often long-term nature of their liabilities.208
Critics might also be concerned that making SOPs transparent would not
necessarily motivate firms to change the actual content and design of their SOPs.
Rather, firms might prefer to leave their SOPs intact and explain why they choose
to adopt ineffective policies, as Viacom has done.209

204. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Executive Compensation
and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577 (2006).
205. See David, Duration of Stock Holding Periods Continue To Fall Globally,
TOPFOREIGNSTOCKS.COM (Sep. 6, 2010), http://topforeignstocks.com/2010/09/06/duration
-of-stock-holding-period-continues-to-fall-globally/.
206. See X. Frank Zhang, Investor Short-Termism and Asset Pricing 1 (November 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20120412231625/http://
mba.yale.edu/faculty/pdf/zhangxf_Investor_short_termism.pdf (accessed by searching “http://
mba.yale.edu/faculty/pdf/zhangxf_Investor_short_termism.pdf” in the Browse History toolbar).
207. EUROFI, PROMOTING LONGER-TERM INVESTMENT BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS:
SELECTED ISSUES AND POLICIES 6 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private
-pensions/48281131.pdf.
208. Recently, institutional investors have been labeled as “short-termist.” Id. at 1. Signs
of growing short-termism include the facts that investment holding periods are becoming
shorter, and that allocations to less liquid, more long-term assets are generally very low and
are being overtaken in importance by allocations to hedge funds and other high-frequency
traders. Id. However, these concerns do not change institutional investors’ basic long-term
incentives, and now there is a trend toward more “responsible” and longer-term investment
among pension funds, life insurers and mutual funds. Id.
209. See Viacom Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 42 (Apr. 16, 2010) (“Given the
significant stock ownership of Messrs. Redstone, Dauman and Dooley ($1.3 billion, $9.5
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My response to this potential concern is that transparency will encourage checks
on corporate decisions with regard to SOPs. It might be that some ineffective
policies should remain weak, and I do not argue that all SOPs should necessarily be
more stringent. The market checks on these policies will ensure that their design
and effectiveness are in line with shareholder interests. My argument is consistent
with the philosophy of U.S. securities law, which requires public companies to
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public. SOPs should
make no exception to this basic principle.
Finally, some critics might argue that the enhanced disclosure I propose might
trigger unintended consequences, such as exerting populist pressure on firms to
adopt overly restrictive SOPs. As I explained in Part VI, inefficiently stringent
policies could end up inflating executive compensation and destroying more value
by making managers too risk averse. Considering the history of congressional
attempts to reform executive compensation, unintended consequences such as those
that caused the surge in overall executive compensation as a result of stock options
and bonuses following the attempt to cap executive salaries in 1993210 should not
come as a surprise.211
However, our experience with the market response to the 2006 SEC pensions
enhanced disclosure reform should alleviate this concern. Disclosure of pension
payments did not trigger an increase in the amount of pensions. Rather, the
adjustment of market prices in connection with pension transparency suggests we
should expect improved efficiency in SOPs when they become transparent.
CONCLUSION
This Article has investigated SOPs. These policies were universally adopted in
response to the 2002 corporate scandals and especially to the widespread pressure to
adopt these policies following the 2008–09 financial crisis. I have shown that firms
advertise SOPs as a key element in their mitigation of risk and their general alignment
of managers’ interests with the interests of shareholders. The current U.S. regulatory
approach to SOPs leaves decisions on the adoption and design of these policies up to
each firm’s own determination, and disclosure requirements are severely flawed.

million and $7.9 million as of February 28, 2010), as well as the significant equity holdings
(with multi-year vesting schedules) of our executive team, the Committee believes senior
management is appropriately incented to manage the business in line with stockholders’
interests and has not established specified executive stock ownership requirements.”).
210. In 1993, provisions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, implemented as
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, eliminated deductibility for executive
compensation in excess of $1 million unless it qualified as “performance-based” pay. See
I.R.C. § 162(m) (1993). While proponents argued that this would constrain compensation
packages by raising their cost to shareholders, corporate pay decisions have been relatively
insulated from this policy intervention. See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram,
Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code To Influence Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. S138, S141 (2002).
211. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of
Trying To Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673,
1687 (2004) (describing the eventual rise in overall executive compensation following the
§162(m) attempt to cap executive pay).
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I contend that SOPs are extremely ineffective in making CEOs retain their firm
stock and that this ineffectiveness is camouflaged in firms’ public filings. Taken
together, these two circumstances are troubling. They raise concerns that SOPs are
unable to fulfill the important objectives they were adopted to attain, that their content
is undesirable, and that these weaknesses reflect excessive managerial power. I leave
for future research the empirical investigation of how executive stock hedging
undermines SOP effectiveness and whether such effect is transparent to investors.
Such future investigation might indicate that the concerns I highlight in this Article
are even more severe.
A regulatory reform that will focus on making SOPs transparent is expected to
push both boards and shareholders to improve the actual content of SOPs in public
firms. It would be a cheap and easy way to facilitate an informed assessment of
SOPs, which would enable constructive discussion on how SOPs should be
designed. The case for making SOPs transparent is set.

